175, 648, 726

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Senegal MS37

[For a discussion of the French relations with the damels of Cayor, a Wolof state, between 1859 and 1864 when this kingdom became part of the colony of Senegal (especially the military operations) see 34:Faidherbe, MS30 Wolof, category 116.]

/29 cont./

*795 [734] [735] any poor person can go to them to ask for alms and hospitality; he will be taken care of for a long time, and for nothing, and thus part of the funds collected by the marabouts is redistributed to their faithful in misfortune.

One must especially not lose sight of the fact that Muridism is /30/ an integral part of Islam, even though it does not completely conform to orthodox Islam, even though it has abuses and faults. It is primarily a spiritual force, and it is necessary that political and social evolution, indispensable to the young country of Senegal, does not take place against Muridism, against Islam, against all spirituality.

*795 666 • 648 It is known that the Senegalese marabouts in general and the Murid leaders in particular, on the occasion of the Referendum of September 28, were definitely in favor of the Franco-African Community. This attitude can not be explained solely, as some might insinuate, by their desire to preserve certain relations with France, whose pro-Islamic policy has always been favorable and profitable for them. The true reason for this choice is that, on the one hand, the marabouts well know the present state of the intellectual and political development of their compatriots, and, on the other hand, they want to defend their religion and its spiritual values.

They know that at the present time the advanced wing of the political and syndicalist world groups together advanced young people who are quite far from any religious practice and thought and very violently pro-Marxist, if not pure Marxists.

They probably feared that, by means of an independence as premature as absolute, the present leaders, moderate on the whole, would be very quickly left behind by the extremists and that these would then institute in Senegal a materialistic and atheistic regime to which true and good Moslems would not be able to rally, and from which, probably, the whole of the population would rapidly suffer.

*795 But the development of this prospect would carry us too far. Let us content ourselves, in conclusion, to bring it up and to

Serer FA32
Wolof MS30

/373 cont./

S Sr W 175 648 Before the arrival of the French garrison in 1865, the Sérère-none ruled supreme over the region. He was established as the traditional enemy of the Wolof, and from time to time he suffered from the incursions of his "tiédos" (2).

W [624] 2. Tiédos: name given to the Wolof war chiefs of Cayor.

After the definitive installation of our troops at Thiès and especially after the running of the Dakar-Saint-Louis railroad in 1885, many Wolof came to settle near our fortified post; at the same time they benefited from our pacificatory presence by being able to create farm villages in the heart of W [464] None country. Diakhaté was established about 1875-1880 (some of its founders worked on the construction of the railroad line in 1884); Keur-Mamour was created at about the same time.

The Bambara villages are more recent: 1890-1895. These were the /374/ terrible years when Samory sacked the southern Sudan and the region of the Wassoulou (east of Beyla in Upper Guinea). Through the authorities, it seems, some of the Bambara and Wassoulonké freed by our troops were sent to Senegal where the policy of groundnut cultivation was in full development. Keur-Issa-Bambara and Karamoko were founded at this time.

S [369] The city of Thiès was not very important at that time; it had hardly more than a thousand inhabitants. Nevertheless, it began to play a primary role; its presence imposed peace in the region formerly so disturbed by the None brigandage or the incursions of Wolof warriors. Its presence facilitated the founding of villages, the number of which would cease to grow in the S 369 [311] [438] subsequent period; all of the land capable of supporting crops was utilized at the beginning of the century.

In the years preceding the Great War, the escale (1)

1. Escale: by extension signifies a stopping place, a commercial agglomeration.

I. INTRODUCTION

> As far as the majority of Frenchmen are concerned, men are born and remain free and equal before the law. Taking this principle further than its immediate implications, the French tend, with regard to the people of their overseas territories, towards assimilation. 000
>
> J. RICHARD-MOLARD

WRITERS on the colonial history of Tropical Africa have usually characterised the French as pursuing a policy of direct rule and political assimilation. These two features have always been stressed in any comparison with British rule in West Africa, which has always been strongly anti-assimilationist and guided by Lord Lugard's theories on indirect rule through existing indigenous institutions. In practice neither colonial power kept, or was able to keep, strictly to its avowed policy; and just as the British found it impossible to impose a system of indirect rule on the peoples of Eastern Nigeria, where traditionally there were no chiefs but democratic organisation at the village level, so too the French found themselves relying frequently on traditional rulers in the administration of their territories and unable to apply a policy of assimilation to nomads or people who had hardly emerged from the Stone Age. Whatever the defects of either theory in practice, it remains true that the French had as their goal, however distant, the cultural and political integration of their colonial peoples, just as Britain, particularly in West Africa, always had as her ulitmate aim the preparation of her colonies for self-government and independence. 648

French assimilation is based on the revolutionary doctrine of the equality of man and at the same time on the assumption of the superiority of European, and in particular

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French, civilisation. Thus the French, when confronted with people they considered barbarians, believed it their mission to convert them into Frenchmen. This implied a fundamental acceptance of their potential human equality, but a total dismissal of African culture as of any value. Africans were considered to be a people without history, without any civilisation worthy of the name, constantly at war with one another and fortunate to have been put in touch with the fruits of French civilisation. Thus French books describe the French conquest of Africa as 'la paix française' and her early administration as 'l'oeuvre civilisatrice'.

Direct rule was a necessary adjunct of a policy of assimilation for in so far as the French relied on the traditional chiefs, so far did they preserve the traditional social structure of the societies they were administering and this made it more difficult to assimilate them to French standards. Nevertheless where chiefs had great traditional authority, the French found it in practice impossible to use them as mere 'agents' of the administration, and were often forced to adopt a more empirical approach to the problem, particularly in the northern sector of the French Cameroons. The successful application of direct rule was further complicated by the size of the areas the administration had to cover and often, if only as a temporary measure, the traditional authority in these areas had to be used if government were to be maintained. Indeed such were the problems of administering so vast an area as French West Africa that the famous French colonial administrator, Lyautey, came to very much the same conclusions as his contemporary, Lugard, about the problems of native administration in Africa. Lyautey also represented a strong strand in French political theory which was opposed to the assimilation of colonial peoples.

On the other hand Harmand, in his *Domination et colonisation*, written in 1910, whilst generally attacking the application of assimilation in Asia, advocated it for Africa where, he believed—as did most of his contemporaries—there was no indigenous culture worthy of the name. 648.

It was not only the practical problems involved that hampered the full application of an assimilationist policy in Africa. French rule in Africa has been just as much a mixture of authoritarianism and liberalism as it has been ever since the Revolution in France. Some of the so-called liberal regimes were effectively reactionary, whilst some of the authoritarian regimes initiated liberal reforms. This curious mixture has been put most succinctly by Robert Delavignette, a colonial administrator of great experience, when he writes in *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*:

> And the Europe of the Revolution and that of the *ancien régime*, far from fighting each other in Africa, worked together on the same task. The young cavalry officer, De la Tour Saint-Ygest, who perhaps left France because he could not stand the Revolutionary equality there, went off to Upper Senegal-Niger to destroy the feudal power of the Tuareg, the principles and sentiments of which he cherished. On the other hand, the man who wielded the power of the Republic at Dakar, adherent of a French Freemason lodge, and member of the Radical-Socialist party, was to become in Africa a governor fanatically attached to old style hierarchy, using autocratic methods to lead the natives along the path of progress.

The French never really faced the full implications of assimilation and in practice remarkably little was done to bring into effect the official policy that all colonial peoples should become French and have all the rights of French citizens, which implies that there should have been a very substantial coloured representation in the metropolitan institutions. Thus in 1921, twenty years after France had established her rule throughout French West Africa, the vast mass of the population still had the inferior status of *sujet*, that is they were subject to summary administrative justice and the corvée or forced labour and had no political rights. Ivory Coast had only 308 inhabitants with the 648
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648 privileges of French citizens; Dahomey, 121; Upper Volta, 641 17; Niger, 9. As late as 1936 out of a total population of fifteen million in French West Africa there were only [633] 2,136 French citizens, with the exception of the citizens of the Four Towns or *Quatre Communes* of Senegal. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff in their book *French West Africa* have suggested that this was because at that time 'the advantages conferred by naturalisation obviously did not compensate in the eyes of the great majority of Africans for acceptance of French law in regard to marriage and inheritance, and for the general shaping of their lives according to the European pattern'. This was only half the 648 truth. Just as important a factor was the sparseness of facilities for education, the keystone to a successful assimilationist policy. As late as 1947 only 1.3 per cent of [871] children of school age in Guinea were actually attending school. In Soudan the figure was higher at 5 per cent, Dahomey 10 per cent and Senegal 12.4 per cent.

In each case Senegal is the exception. Senegal sent a deputy to the French Assembly as early as 1848. Her first indigenous deputy, Blaise Diagne, elected in 1914, became Under Secretary of State for the Colonies on several occasions before his death in 1934. But the other territories of French black Africa did not elect deputies until 1946, though they sent representatives to the Constituent Congress 648 in 1945. In 1848 the privileges of French citizenship were 641 granted to all Senegalese living in the Colony, though they [671] were allowed to retain their private law in matters of land, inheritance, marriage and divorce. It was only in 1946 with the passing of the *loi Lamine Guèye* that the privileges of citizenship were granted to Africans other than those who obtained naturalisation, which involved accepting French 648 private law. In Senegal, the towns of St. Louis and Gorée [633] were created *communes de pleins exercice* or full scale municipal councils in 1872 and seven years later a General Council [646] on the lines of those operating in the French departments was established.

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

648 established. Until recent years Senegal was the only territory with an educational system in any way compatible with a policy of assimilation.

Thus, with the exception of Senegal, there evolved a mixed policy containing elements of assimilation and separation which came to be known as the policy of association. Even so, as Lord Hailey wrote in his recent *African Survey*, 'the underlying assumption remained that, on a long view, the future of the overseas territories must be one of eventual integration with France in a larger political unit'. And though assimilationist policy was never really successful on the political level, on the personal level, particularly in education where equality of black and white was so frequently demonstrated, it left deep marks. To quote Lord Hailey once again, this time from his 1939 *African Survey*, 'it is not easy to exaggerate the effect on native outlook of a system which permits Africans to sit side by side with French children and to compete with them on equal terms in examinations'.

121 Since assimilation was only practised in any real measure in Senegal, it is the most interesting of all the French African colonies as the one most marked by contact with the metropolitan power. This book is therefore a study of Senegal with particular reference to a special kind of race relations whereby one people, whilst accepting the fundamental equality of the other, attempts to assimilate it to its own standards in every sphere of life. An attempt will be made to assess to what extent French assimilation was successful in Senegal and why the Senegalese eventually reacted against it; the subsequent marks it was to leave on this newly independent state; the extent to which indigenous culture withstood assimilationist policy; and finally what sort of society the Senegalese, now independent of France, are trying to create for themselves.

Senegal becomes even more interesting as a present day case study. For in applying their policy of assimilation, the [563] French Government had to remember that Senegal was the

5t Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

II. FRENCH ASSIMILATION IN PRACTICE

> ... that France above all should understand this great mission which the Lord has entrusted to her . . . by sending missions composed of men of clear courage and integrity and of superior intelligence . . . to serve as intermediaries and interpreters between these more or less savage people on the one hand and the civilisation and institutions of Europe on the other . . . 000
>
> Heinrich Barth

In a few short words the great German explorer Heinrich Barth summed up the ideals of French assimilationist policy in Africa. But as we have seen these ideals were to be tempered not only by the realities of colonial administration but also by the failure of the French ever to accept the full implications of an assimilationist policy. Nowhere was this clearer than in Senegal, where France carried out in one part of the country what may be described in terms of nineteenth-century colonial administration as a very advanced policy of assimilation whilst subjecting the rest of the country to an authoritarian rule unknown in British West Africa. 648

Senegal came into contact with the French in the early seventeenth century when French commercial companies started trading at the mouth of the river Senegal, first entered by Europeans in 1445. In 1659 Caullier founded the town of St. Louis on an island at the mouth of the river. For the rest of the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century, the fort he built there, around which grew up a prosperous trading town dominated by the great chartered companies, was to be the centre of French commercial activity on the west coast of Africa. 175 [439]

Though the French did explore the Senegal river and even established a fort at Podor in 1745, they had no control of the hinterland; their sphere of influence was strictly limited to the island on which St. Louis was built and to the

175 small island of Gorée further down the coast. However this
did not mean that the French lacked interest in the interior.
From 1749-53 Michel Adanson explored the Senegalese
coast and undertook the first really scientific description of
West Africa. His writings were largely responsible for the
later hope that European colonisation of this part of Africa
would be possible. But for the rest of the eighteenth century
France's hold on St. Louis was too tenuous for anything of
this nature to be undertaken. Indeed during the Seven
Years' War the town fell to the British and was only returned
175 in 1779. By the end of the eighteenth century St. Louis
563 with a population of 7,000, had a European colony numbering 600, the largest on the whole of the West Coast. It also
369 had an important assimilated mulatto community, whose
[162] descendants are known today as St. Louisiens. Indeed there
had been a very high degree of *métissage* by the end of the
eighteenth century, since most Frenchmen there took
permanent African mistresses known as *signares*, and ensured
the education of any children they had by them. Indeed
in all but legal status these *signares* were wives and their
'marriages' were celebrated by their families with all the
pomp of a normal wedding. However, with the improvement of communications between Senegal and France and
the arrival of larger numbers of soldiers in the middle of
the nineteenth century, mistresses were much more temporary in nature and the number of Frenchmen prepared to
educate resulting offspring was considerably reduced.

175 In 1789 St. Louis sent its *cahier* of grievances to the States-
567 General on the eve of the French Revolution, demanding
the end of the monopoly of the great companies, freedom of
trade and the abolition of slavery, which had hitherto formed
[439] the main item of export from St. Louis. These grievances
were heeded. Slavery was abolished and the companies
had their charters withdrawn. But the position of slaves
and slave-trading in the colonies was not in fact settled until
the end of the wars that followed the French Revolution.

175 During these wars St. Louis once again fell to the British
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5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

S

and only under the terms of the Treaty of Paris which ended 648
the Napoleonic Wars was it finally returned to the French [175]
in 1817. Under King Louis XVIII, France embarked on a
policy of European colonisation of Senegal. Colonel S W
Schmaltz negotiated with Moctar Diop, the Lebou chief 648
of the small village of Dakar, for land to settle 200 emigrants
to be despatched from France under the auspices of the
Société Coloniale Philanthropique. But climate and disease
soon put an end to this venture. Nevertheless Schmaltz
persisted with his schemes in St. Louis so that Senegal could
by its products enrich the mother country. He made agreements
with local chiefs for the agricultural settlement of
part of the Oualo or hinterland of St. Louis and in 1819
a model farm was established to experiment in the growing of S
cotton, olives, dates, coconuts and coffee. This policy was 648
pursued enthusiastically by his successor, Baron Roger,
and a number of experiments, mainly concerned with
cotton, were undertaken in the next few years. By 1822
nearly fifty concessions had been granted to the French by
local chiefs and for the next five years further experiments
were carried out by Monsieur Richard who started a full
scale research station at what is now called Richard-Toll
or Richard's field. But his efforts were not crowned with
success, and later governors influenced by the reaction against
colonialism in France lost interest in agricultural settlement.
This was perhaps fortunate for modern Senegal,
since had these first experiments been fruitful she might
have been saddled with a settler problem today.

France was already working towards an assimilationist
policy. A governmental despatch to Schmaltz informed
him that his political aim should be 'to introduce gradually
among the blacks of Senegal a civilisation based on free
labour . . . education, and public peace . . .' It continued: S
'A mulatto is now mayor of the capital of our possessions, [563]
and a black could become so too.' Two years later Baron
Roger was informed that since most of the free population [369]
of St. Louis was mulatto or African it was 'very important

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

648 [563] [369] not to let the same discriminations and prejudices such as exist in other colonies be introduced among them.' At the same time the metropolitan Government was asking whether Africans would make suitable corporals and under-officers. Furthermore Schmaltz, whilst advocating a system of economic exploitation that seemed to be entirely to the advantage of France, maintained that the Senegalese were not merely to be auxiliaries and that they would be encouraged by fixed prices for their crops to produce more and become 'civilised' by their contact with Europe.

648 567 641 So far France had made no definition of the position of non-French inhabitants of her colonies. Even though France by the decree of 16 Pluviose Year II (1792) had abolished slavery and declared that 'all men, without distinction of colour, domiciled in French colonies, are French citizens, and enjoy all the rights assured by the Constitution', and even though the slave trade had been outlawed in 1818, until 1833 freed slaves had uncertain status in law, and domestic slaves still existed in large numbers. A royal ordinance of that year proclaimed that 'Any person born free or having legally acquired his liberty enjoys in the French colonies: (1) civil rights; (2) political rights under conditions prescribed by law'. But only in 1848 was the status of *captif* or domestic slave abolished, though the majority of *captifs* continued to serve with their former masters. Naturally this law only affected inhabitants of St. Louis and Gorée and the other French posts like Dagana and Richard-Toll.

648 [641] [818] [797] The most important result of these two laws was to give about 12,000 Africans, mostly illiterate, the full rights of French citizens. Of these less than a thousand had been converted to Christianity by their French, mulatto or Christian African masters. Educational facilities, which would have to accompany any effective conversion of illiterates into full scale French citizens were still rudimentary. But it must be remembered that in France, at the time, the electorate was suddenly increased from 200,000 to

9,000,000 most of whom were illiterate. Balzac, in 1845, wrote in his book *Les paysans*: 648

> For twenty million beings in France the law is merely a piece of white paper stuck on the door of the Church or the Town Hall . . . Many mayors of cantons turn their copies of the *Bulletin des Lois* into bags for holding raisins and seeds. As for the mere mayors of communes you would be shocked by the number who cannot read or write and by the way in which the civil registers are kept.

Most remarkable of the innovations of the short lived French Second Republic of 1848-52, in which the Revolution once more came into its own, was the granting of the right to Senegal of sending a deputy to the National Assembly in France. Grandly it was announced, 'The Colonies purified of slavery . . . will be represented in the National Assembly'. Effectively, such a deputy would be representing an overwhelming majority of African 'citizens' [162]
for metropolitan Frenchmen numbered then only some 500. [563]
However it was to take some time before the African citizens [666]
were to use this newly acquired right to elect one of their own number to the Assembly.

The 1848 Revolution thus embroidered on the 1833 ordinance of the French monarchy by introducing a full scale assimilationist policy for the colonies of France. In Senegal it affected only a small number of people. And never again would France in her expansion through Africa apply this trend in her colonial policy so liberally to her newly acquired territories. Thereafter there was to be a tussle with those administrators who either felt that the inhabitants of the colonial territories were different and should be treated as such, or were overwhelmed by the practical problems involved in applying an assimilationist policy to a largely illiterate population spread over an area eight times the size of France.

The reaction to the liberal thinking of the second republic soon came with Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* by which an authoritarian Second Empire was established. In 1854 the right of electing a deputy was withdrawn from all

648 colonies other than Martinique, Guadeloupe and Réunion
and at the same time they were subjected to rule by direct
decree of the Emperor.

[167] It was under the Second Empire that the first great period
of French colonial expansion in black Africa took place. It
was during that regime that Faidherbe, who was to Senegal
what Lugard was to Nigeria, first embarked on his African
conquests. Faidherbe himself embodied this dichotomy in
French colonial policy: an authoritarian agent of an
authoritarian regime, he was often found introducing
reforms and innovations that conformed with the most
liberal application of an assimilationist policy.

[643] Faidherbe was appointed Governor of Senegal in 1854.
369 At the time St. Louis, according to Abbé Boilaut in his
[162] *Esquisses sénégalaises* was a city of 12,336 inhabitants with
[563] only 177 Europeans. There were two primary schools run
by Catholic missionaries. A full scale administration had
[872] succeeded in imposing on a town otherwise consisting mainly
[797] of single storey houses, a governor's palace, a 'very elegant
[361] Palace of Justice', a large naval hospital, a fine church and
an army barracks.

648 From his base at St. Louis, Faidherbe, in a series of
643 brilliant campaigns, notably against the powerful emir of
Trarza and the Muslim reformist and Toucouleur leader,
El Hadj Omar, was to lay the foundations of France's West
African empire. To do this he organised the now famous
Tirailleurs Sénégalais, since Europeans did not stand up well
to the climate and the prevalent diseases. By conquest or by
treaty he brought most of modern Senegal and much of
643 Soudan (Mali) under French rule. He installed an efficient
military administration, and even published an official
[804] newspaper the *Moniteur du Sénégal*. Altogether Faidherbe
was a remarkable man. He was a firm believer in the
equality of races, and did much to increase the educational
[871] facilities of the colony. He established a school for the sons
of chiefs, and lay schools for Muslims, who objected to
[797] attending the mission schools. Whilst Faidherbe wanted to

encourage the evangelisation of the population, he[1] was 643
sufficiently knowledgeable about the country and its people [097]
to realise that it would be impossible to win converts from among the Muslims who formed the majority in Senegal. Scholarships for primary education in St. Louis, and secondary education in France were awarded under his auspices [871]
to promising students. Small technical schools were established at Dakar. And he even opened a museum at St. Louis.

He tried to equip the colony with some of the benefits of a modern economy. He established the Bank of Senegal, [453]
laid out St. Louis afresh as befitted a capital city, and under his influence Pinet-Laprade founded the new port of Dakar. [369]
He promoted the export of the ground-nut crop, becoming [439]
increasingly valuable to the colony's revenue which rose from 12 million francs in 1848 to 37 million in 1869, and [433]
proved a profitable substitute for human merchandise. He made valuable and detailed studies of the local people. Like Lugard he seemed to be able to think of every aspect of administration at the same time. The historian G. Hardy wrote of him: 'He touched on everything, and always with good results.' But as J. Richard-Molard commented, 'He was the first great Frenchman to realise the wish of Barth. But he did it as an officer of the Empire, endowed with an abominable character and a sense of authority which bordered on vice. He was proconsul of an authoritarian Empire.'

One decision vital for the future of the Senegal was made 648
during the Faidherbian regime: this was the final abandonment of any ideals of European colonisation. It came at a time when the French were settling Algeria, and was not altogether altruistic, as the ministerial instructions of 1859 showed:

> Nothing similar to Algeria could be undertaken in Senegal. The climate is against it. The land should therefore be left to the natives, at least as a general rule. It is by their hands that it should be cultivated and if our rule is to be extended over all the territory

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[1] [i.e., Faidherbe, who became Governor in 1854--Analyst]

648 that belongs to us, our occupation should be limited to those parts necessary for assuring the suppression of brigandage, the freedom of trade and the tranquillity of an industrious population.

The land cultivated by them will provide produce which will become the object of lucrative trade for the European, the only kind of work he can undertake in this climate.

648 By 1865 the colony of Senegal comprised 150,000 inhabitants
641 of whom only some 15,000, living in the original
161 French settlements of St. Louis and Gorée-Dakar, were
160 French citizens. Indeed this number was not to increase
563 noticeably until the end of the century, since the privileges
granted to those Africans under French rule in 1848 were
never extended to the interior. For whilst Faidherbe
pursued a policy of assimilation in the main centres like St.
Louis, Gorée and Dakar, he initiated the basis of a system of
administration for what was to become the rest of modern
Senegal and French black Africa as a whole that was distinctly
non-assimilationist. The laws for the *sujets* or those
who did not enjoy the rights of French citizens were particularly
167 harsh. They were not allowed to leave the colony,
they had no right of meeting or association, and they
466 were subjected to the corvée or forced labour on the maintenance
653 of roads. To obtain this forced labour Faidherbe
631 relied on the chiefs, and indeed one of the main criticisms
of him as an exponent of assimilationism is that he leaned
so heavily on both the chiefs and Islam. The treaty made
by Jauréguiberry (acting-Governor whilst Faidherbe was
on leave in 1865) with Abdoul Boubaker of Toro was far
removed from the principles of assimilation: 'Art. 2—The
Toro will continue to administer itself according to its own
laws, traditions and customs.'

The overthrow of the Second Empire and the establishment
of the Third Republic in 1870 was to see lukewarm
reaffirmation of principles of the revolution and a consequent
return to assimilationist principles at least in the
646 political field. In 1871 Senegal regained her deputy. More

important still a Conseil-Général equivalent to the Conseils- 641
Généraux of the French department but with much greater 648
financial autonomy was established for the colony. However 646
representation was limited to citizens of the colony and not
the great majority of *sujets* of the Protectorate. This spurt
of assimilation was completed a year later when privileges 633
of local self-government were granted to St. Louis and 641
Gorée which were created *communes de pleine exercice.* In
1880 the prosperous new port of Rufisque, some fifteen
miles from modern Dakar, was also accorded these privileges,
and in 1887 Dakar was separated from Gorée and also
gained them.

This was as far as assimilation was to go politically 648
in either Senegal or the rest of French West Africa. Not 641
until 1944 was there any extension of political rights in French black Africa. Indeed in Senegal the citizens had to fight to retain their privileges against an administration that came increasingly to regret the privileges it had granted the Senegalese in the first fine flush of colonial expansion in Black Africa. Thus until the outbreak of the Second World War one had the paradoxical situation of the French regretting their assimilationist policy and the Senegalese citizens asking that it be applied more liberally. This is one of the main reasons why the activities of French Africans, particularly in Senegal, were channelled not towards the attainment of independence but the assertion of their fundamental equality with the French. Their energies were for long directed to obtaining from the French those rights which in principle an assimilationist policy offered them.

III. FRENCH REACTION AGAINST ASSIMILATION

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> France had made a great mistake in granting suffrage to the Natives. She did not withdraw her present, but took good care not to repeat it elsewhere.
>
> PIERRE MILLE: *The Black Vote in Senegal.*

648 UNTIL 1913 all the Senegalese deputies in the French Chamber of Deputies were citizens of metropolitan origin. And in the General Council and the municipal councils Europeans, even when they were not in a majority, more often than not succeeded in controlling proceedings. With this European domination of the representative institutions, it may come as a surprise that France not only failed to extend the experiment to other parts of French Africa, but indeed did her best to suppress those rights already granted in Senegal. First of all many of the Governors resented the control the General Council had over the territorial budget, albeit limited. Secondly they found that the General Council tried to run a peace-time administration for that part of Senegal under direct rule, whilst the Governors were more concerned with the pacification of the much larger hinterland, for in those days Senegal included much of what is now Mali. As one historian of Senegal, André Villard, has put it: 'The Colony thought it had the right to lead the quiet life of a French *arrondissement* at the very time when expansion towards the east necessitated exceptional political and military efforts.' An authoritarian Governor like Brière de l'Isle found it particularly galling to be saddled with a democratically elected legislative council. Furthermore the General-Councillors, who were mainly European or half-caste up

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[p 16]

till the end of the nineteenth century, neglected the Protectorate 646
and seemed to think that the only parts of the 563
country that mattered were the four communes. Naturally 633
their official business with the Protectorate was limited, but
they did control the three main ports of the country through [439]
which the products of the interior passed to France. The 646
councillors, too, restricted education largely to the communes, 871
where on the whole it reached a satisfactory level.
They even sent students on scholarships to France, but [369]
unfortunately too few of these returned to Senegal to use
their newly acquired talents. It was not until the establishment
of the Government-General of French West Africa
in 1905 that educational facilities were extended to the [648]
Protectorate in any great measure.

The increase in education amongst citizens of African 641
origin meant that by the turn of the nineteenth century they were less willing to accept European domination in the communes and the General Council. The assertion of their rights is one of the main factors behind the attempts of the administration to deprive the indigenous Senegalese of their position as *citoyens*. Actually the Administration was batting on a good wicket. Technically a French citizen was one who accepted French rights and duties without qualification.
In the case of the Africans in Senegal they had been allowed [671]
to retain their own *statut personnel*, that is private law, with reference to civil disputes, matrimony, divorce, inheritance and land. But this seemed to conflict openly with the definition of a French citizen. It seemed wrong that a man should exercise the rights of a French citizen and not accept the consequent obligations. Many Frenchmen felt it quite illogical that an African with four wives could yet be a citizen. And indeed in later years the main obstacle to granting citizenship to other colonial peoples was to be the question of retention of the *statut personnel*. Thus many of the attempts by the French to deprive the Senegalese citizens of their rights were the result of quite genuine
objections to the illogicality of their position. Faidherbe, [643]

Faidherbe,
643 writing in 1889, protested against this attitude since he felt
641 that to make monogamy a condition of citizenship would
break up families and that monogamy should be achieved by
education. But more potent were those forces which disliked
the exercise of such rights by a small African minority, albeit
linked with Europeans, which could so often obstruct not
only the Governor of Senegal but the Governor-General
himself, since until 1904 these two were one and the same
man. The existence of a vocal General Council and
Municipal Councils, let alone a deputy in France, which
could all express opinions directly hostile to the authoritarian
rule of the Governor, was another important factor behind
the moves to deprive the Senegalese of their citizenship
at the end of the nineteenth century. There was also
666 however quite genuine concern at the way in which the vote
641 was exercised in Senegal. Pierre Mille, in an article entitled
The Black Vote in Senegal published in 1901, alleged that the
African voters, mainly illiterate, were controlled by the
handful of Europeans who bought their votes. He went so
far as to describe Senegal as a 'rotten borough'. Indeed he
alleged that the expense of the election absorbed a large
part of the colony's finances: and further that after competing
against each other for the electors' favour, the big
companies in Senegal finally decided to combine the
operation to save expenses and control Senegal to their
641 mutual advantage. But as to the virtue of the Senegalese
as citizens in other respects Mille was surprisingly warm:
[595] 'Having become French citizens and notwithstanding that
they were Muslims, they, with a few exceptions, accepted
monogamy . . . and they have spread far and wide in Africa
the renown and justice of French administration'. But as
Mille concluded, this was not sufficient to persuade France
648 to continue the experiment in her other West African
colonies. Indeed, confirming what has already been said
about empirical tendencies in French colonial rule, by
1900, when France had gained most of her vast African
empire, Mille commented that it was 'administered with an

interesting suppleness under the most diverse conditions 648
according to the state of civilisation or submission—or
lack of submission—of the natives'.

As a reaction against the powers of the Senegalese General 648
Council during the regrouping of the French West African 646
territories the Protectorate, with the exception of Casamance, Thiès, Cayor and Tivaouane and the *cercles* of the [633]
Fleuve, was detached from the colony of Senegal so that the General Council could not legitimately interfere in its affairs. However two years later economic and administrative exigencies decreed the reshaping of Senegal and the rest of French Africa into the territorial boundaries that exist today.

The first major attempt to undermine the rights of the 641
Senegalese with the rights of citizens by virtue of being born 633
in one of the four communes, known as *originaires*, came in 1908 when the Lieutenant-Governor of Senegal asked that 1,563 names be struck off the electoral role of Dakar arguing that since the natives concerned were only French subjects they could not vote. Only French citizens could vote, and citizenship could be obtained only by individual naturalisation. This was upheld in the local court but rejected by the [692]
Cour de Cassation in Paris. However, the Court confirmed that these voters were not French citizens though they maintained that they had the right to vote. This failure to recognise their status as citizens evoked much ill-feeling among the *originaires*. In 1910 the voting rights in the Senegal were in fact extended when it was provided that French citizens living outside the communes but within the colony could vote. But the Minister of Colonies declared that the decree did not apply to 'non-naturalised natives who only enjoy the franchise in the four *communes de pleine exercice* on condition of being born there', and thus once again emphasised the fact that the French Government did not consider the *originaires* as true citizens. Indeed in the following year their position was further aggravated when [701]
originaires doing their military service in metropolitan units

641 An interesting sidelight on the confused French attitude
towards assimilation and Africans was the status accorded
648 to Blaise Diagne as Commissioner of the Republic in charge
[643] of conscription of troops in West Africa. He was given rank
equal to that of the Governor-General, Van Vollenhoven,
who thereat resigned. However this is only one side of the
story. The French insist that he resigned because he felt that
the large number of troops to be recruited would wreck the
colony's economy and severely reduce the indigenous population.
Nevertheless the presence of an African deputy for
Senegal was not viewed well in all quarters. But Diagne
could not be tempted by high office outside the parliamentary
sphere and won a resounding victory in the 1919 elections
[666] with 7,444 votes to his opponent's 1,252. He was then
appointed Under Secretary of States for Colonies. His essential
attachment to France was clear, for whilst in 1919 he became
President of the Pan-African Congress, which urged
that ultimately 'Africa should be ruled by consent of the
Africans . . .' he refused, as Virginia Thompson and Richard
Adloff have pointed out 'to support any revolutionary theories
as to the emancipation of all Negro peoples'. 'We
French natives', he said, 'wish to remain French, since
France has given us every liberty'.

646 The French were still not happy about the position of the
originaires and in 1920, not so much from a show of liberalism
633 as from a desire to reduce the pressures exercised on the
Administration by the twenty-member General Council,
it was translated into a Colonial Council with an increased
membership of forty-four of which twenty were sent by the
hitherto unrepresented Protectorate. The representatives
[631] of the *sujets*, who were provincial ~~or~~ cantonal chiefs, could
be relied on to vote with the Administration whose agents
they were, and thus reduce the independence of the communes.
In 1925, however, the number of chiefs was reduced
to sixteen and the citizens' representatives increased to
twenty-four as a means of persuading them to vote larger

taxes, but thereafter relations between chiefs and Govern[redacted] hand and citizens on the other were rarely cordial. 646 [633] [631]

The powers of the Council were very restricted, having legislative rights over minor matters like the classification of roads and the management of public properties. Even these limited powers were subject to the veto of the Governor-General of French West Africa. [648] Its main deliberative competence was over the budget, which though drawn up by the Governor could be criticised by the councillors. [652] This power was watered down by the classification of a large section of the budget as obligatory expenditure. [643] Nevertheless the council was an exceptional institution in West Africa. As R. L. Buell in his *The Native Problem in Africa* wrote:

> That the eight Europeans who participated in the Council should have exactly the same status as the thirty-two blacks is a situation which would strike the Anglo-Saxon as anomalous to say the least. 563 646 The visitor to the Council will frequently witness a black president calling a European member to order for rowdiness. It does not appear, however, that the council is divided upon racial lines, i.e. of white versus black, except on the issue of higher pay for European officials—a policy which was, in fact, attacked as vigorously by the Europeans as by the native members. The real alignment so far has been the citizen members—both black and European—against the government supported by the chiefs. Black members as we have seen, have unmercifully criticised officials in Senegal. No British colony would tolerate the attacks which the natives make upon European officials in Senegal.

Buell pin-pointed a growing division in the territory— 641 that between the *originaires* and the *sujets* of the Protectorate. The *originaires*, especially since the election of one of their own number as deputy, became increasingly jealous of their privileges. Meanwhile the rest of the territory was administered according to the same principles of administration as were applied throughout the rest of West Africa. Though [631] traditional chiefs were stripped of their traditional powers

641 they were made agents of the Administration and responsible
[631] for the enforcement of the corvée when required. The
harshness of this authoritarian rule, escaped only by the
evolués in the other territories, has been vividly described
by Geoffrey Gorer in *Africa Dances*, which records a long
tour made through French West Africa in the mid-thirties.
Even so in 1930 France had signed the Geneva Act for-
[466] bidding forced labour in the colonies; but it was slow to
disappear. In 1937 the right to form trade unions, which
[467] hitherto was only granted to Senegalese citizens by a law of
1920, was extended in a restricted form to the *sujets*. That
same year a new decree allowed easier conditions for the
acquisition of French citizenship by the *sujets*. Out of a
population of 1,800,000 in 1936 there were 78,000 citizens
compared with some 2,400 in the rest of French West
Africa. And in 1939 the *sujets* were granted the right of
[666] electing some of their representatives to the Colonial
Council instead of being represented only by nominees of
the Administration.

641 This newly acquired right was enjoyed for a very brief
648 period. For in 1940 the authoritarian element in France
came to the fore in particularly unhappy circumstances
with the fall of France and the establishment of the Vichy Government. Under the Vichy regime, racism manifested itself openly for the first time. This was particularly embittering for the Senegalese élite since they had been much in sympathy with the Popular Front Government which attempted liberal experiments in Algeria and Syria. All Senegalese representative institutions were suppressed. Priority was given to Europeans in rationed goods and in many other spheres. Liberty of association was withdrawn from both races, and whilst European members of the resistance were rarely hanged, Africans themselves rarely escaped the supreme penalty. By contrast in France the future President of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, was fighting in the French resistance and was later interned in a German concentration camp.

Senegal had never in fact been free from elements of 641
racism, though such a policy was never officially counten- 648
anced until the Vichy regime. Geoffrey Gorer found many
instances of discrimination in Dakar, and actually went
as far as to say that 'The colour bar is extremely strong in
Dakar'. But he concluded 'these French citizens are far
happier than their brother French Negro subjects; if they
are too badly cheated or abused they have some redress
in the law courts'. The colour bar was certainly not
official policy then as it became under the Vichy Adminis-
tration.

The Vichy regime marks the end of an era in West 648
Africa and particularly in Senegal. Until 1940 there had
been little or no opposition to French assimilationist policy
by the Africans. Indeed they were the first to criticise any
deviations from it. Blaise Diagne enjoyed high status in
France, and though he was accused by his critics of corrup-
tion and of selling himself to the French he remained the
popular choice in Senegal until his death.

At the ensuing election Galandou Diouf defeated Blaise 648
Diagne's old opponent, Lamine Guèye, who was instru- 665
mental in the formation of the Senegalese branch of the 662
S.F.I.O. Hitherto elections had been largely fought on the
basis of personal followings, with the exception of the
European-dominated *Parti Socialiste Sénégalais* founded in
1929 in which Europeans played a prominent role. Not
only was Lamine Guèye the first Senegalese to realise the [667]
value of the party machine, but he was also the first to
advocate the granting of full political and legal rights to [641]
all French Africans. Significantly he did not suggest any
form of break with France, rather that France should carry
her assimilationist policy to its logical conclusions. In
1939 he increased his political backing considerably when
the *P.S.S.* fused with his section of the *S.F.I.O.* and this
was to make him a leading member of the party in the
metropolis as well as in Senegal.

However the younger generation of Senegalese were 000

However the younger generation of Senegalese were

648 891 571 beginning to question the moral right of assimilation. These critics were the educated élite, by-products of an educational policy of which Governor-General Chaudié had written in 1897: 'The school is the surest means of action by which a civilising nation can transmit its ideas to people who are still primitive and by which it can raise them gradually to its own standards. In a word the school is the supreme element of progress. It is also the most effective tool of propaganda for the French language that the Government can use.'

Ousmane Socé Diop, in *Karim*, a remarkable study of the sort of young Senegalese most affected by French assimilation, published in 1935, shows not only how effective this policy was in those early days, but also points to the awakening of the Senegalese to the values of their own traditional society.

648 591 On certain evenings in Dakar, Karim and his young friends would talk not only of love but of their political and social ideas:

> The teacher was there, reasonable, but capable at moments of behaving foolishly, such as over the beautiful eyes of a Senegalese girl. He was a 'progressive', a partisan of a plan of evolution with its basis in the fundamental characteristics of his people.
>
> The graduate, a know-all, spoke of 'cleaning-up Senegalese traditions and of bringing about an immediate and thorough Europeanisation.
>
> The doctor, a Catholic, adopted Western civilisation without question. Nevertheless, his atavistic temperament remained one with that of his own people.
>
> Abdou was born a Muslim and an oriental and had been educated at a French school. His mind had been nurtured on European ideas and logic. His heart had been formed within the curious framework of the *Khalam*, of French poetry and European music. He was a person of contrasts. He could dance to the tam-tam as well as do the tango, he liked Negro music and black girls, but also dreamed of Deauville, of Paris and of some film-starlet, a blonde blue-eyed Venus.

[369] Later Karim is sent out to a small town in the 'bush' where he has to help with the collection of the ground-nut

crop. Struck by the simple, uncomplicated ways of the bush 648
compared with that of Dakar, Rufisque and St. Louis he 571
reflects: 'The teacher and above all the graduate who spoke 369
so often of immediate and complete Europeanisation, should
be here to see for themselves.'

Ousmane Socé Diop has pin-pointed perfectly the growing conflict in the minds of the educated Senegalese at this time and the ever increasing gap between the peoples of the *Quatre Communes* and the *sujets* of the bush.

Furthermore the Senegalese student in Paris was beginning to question the rights of colonialism in general and the honesty of France's assimilationist policy in particular. He was hardly encouraged by the pronouncements of a leading politician during the twenties and thirties like Albert Sarraut who wrote in *La mise en valeur de nos colonies* that the colonies had a threefold purpose of serving France. First the numbers of France's overseas peoples increased her population from 40 million to 100 million, thus giving her a greater manpower than Germany. Secondly they could make a financial contribution to France. Thirdly they could supply her with the raw materials she needed. France's civilising mission, whilst important, was conceived of by Sarraut as a by-product of these functions. (Quoted in L. P. Mair, *Native Policies in Africa.*)

As we have seen, assimilationist professions were rarely 571
matched by the facts. And indeed in other parts of French 871
West Africa education was limited. But in Senegal France 648
made a major effort in education, so that by 1940 there had
already been formed a substantial African élite, particularly
in comparison to the country's population.

By 1938 18,000 boys and 1,500 girls, taught by 132 European and 337 African teachers were at school; even so, a very low percentage of the population of school age actually attended school. Nevertheless this was considerably higher than that of any other French African territory. Children were educated according to French methods with few concessions made to local factors. The aim was not

571 only to civilise them but to make them aware of 'France's
871 achievements' in Africa. Thus, as Lucy Mair has pointed
648 out, history was taught so as to justify French occupation of
873 West Africa. Several important *lycées* and secondary schools
were founded. The *Lycée Faidherbe* and the *Lycée Van Vollenhoven* were to provide the basis of the modern élite whilst the *Ecole Normale William Ponty* educated many of the present leaders of French-speaking Africa. It was this new generation of educated young men, produced in the late twenties and thirties, that was first to question the virtues of an assimilationist policy both on the political and moral plane.

IV. REFORMS

The aims of France's civilising mission accomplished in the colonies rules out any idea of autonomy, any possibility of evolution outside the French empire bloc; the eventual constitution, however remote, of self-government in the colonies is out of the question. 000

Brazzaville Conference, 1944

THE years that followed the fall of Vichy France were to see great changes in the political structure of French Africa. Senegal itself benefited less from these changes than the other African territories, for the main substance of the changes was to bring the other territories constitutionally in line with her. Though two Senegalese deputies, Maître Lamine Guèye and Léopold Sédar Senghor, were to play a leading role in the shaping of the new constitution of the Fourth Republic for France and her overseas territories, the first initiative for change came from the much more backward colonies of French Equatorial Africa, who, unlike the French authorities in Senegal and French West Africa, had never accepted the Vichy regime. 648

At the conference held in Brazzaville in 1944 on the eve of the fall of the Vichy Government to decide the future role of Tropical Africa in a liberated France, the coloured Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, Felix Eboué, one of de Gaulle's most loyal supporters, and who enjoyed immense prestige in French Africa, played the leading part. This conference effectively marks the beginning of modern French African politics, though no African politicians, least of all the experienced Senegalese, participated in it. Characteristically the delegates, mainly colonial administrators, were torn between the ideals of assimilation and the more practical virtues of political and administrative decentralisation.

648 The conference decided that the political future of the colonies should lie with France and ruled out all ideas of eventual independence. They did, however, insist that the colonies should be represented at the constituent Assembly that would draw up the constitution for the Fourth Republic at the end of the war. But they did not consider that the wider representation of Africans in metropolitan institutions would be as beneficial to the African colonies as the establishment of a Federal Assembly for France and its empire. These two suggestions were in tune with traditional integrationist and assimilationist thought, but in addition the delegates made certain proposals that implied considerable administrative and political decentralisation. They asked that assemblies should be set up for each territory, but on the understanding that they should work in close relation to the proposed Federal Assembly and that if possible the franchise should be as wide as practicable for Africans. They also laid down the principle of the dual college, so that Europeans could have effective representation. The administrators of the 'Republic one and Indivisible' were thereby advocating a considerable degree of administrative decentralisation, which in retrospect can be seen as vital to the subsequent achievement of independence by the various states of French black Africa. It was probably fortunate that the conference was one of administrators and not of politicians for their cogent arguments against the inefficiency of the pre-war, highly centralised empire were accepted eventually as directed towards the achievement of a more efficient working of the empire rather than as an attempt to break it up as they certainly might have been had such criticisms come from African politicians. On the other hand the conference made it explicit that decentralisation did not imply independence. All possibility of autonomy outside the French bloc was excluded.

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The conference^z was highly assimilationist in its recommendations for individuals particularly as regards political

z [i.e., Brazzaville Conference, 1944--Analyst]

and juridical rights. The old signs of inequality, the 641
indigénat and the hated corvée were to be withdrawn, 648●
the latter after a period of five years. Education was to [871]
remain exclusively French, though Eboué put in a plea for the recognition of the values of traditional society. The problems of granting French citizenship to Africans without prejudicing their *statut personnel* was to be solved within the [671]
framework of the proposed Federal Parliament for France and her overseas territories. Africans would thus have citizenship of this larger Federation rather than of France itself and would not therefore have to give up their *statut personnel*. The new principle was first applied in March 1944. French citizenship was extended to a number of Muslims in Algeria who were allowed to retain their *statut personnel*, on the same terms as the *originaires* of Senegal had been. Finally the conference proposed a large scale development programme for the overseas territories.

In the Constituent Assembly which was to deliberate on 648
the constitution of the Fourth Republic, sixty-four seats were given to overseas deputies, a fair number going to Africans. Two socialists from Senegal, Lamine Guèye and his lieutenant Léopold Sédar Senghor, the first African to become a *professeur agrégé* of the Sorbonne, played a leading role in the debates of the new constitution, attacking remnants of Vichy racialism amongst colonial officials, decrying the ban on freedom of meeting and association, [641]
and above all denouncing the corvée and *indigénat*. The first Constituent Assembly of 1945, liberal in outlook, was deeply concerned as to how the Republic could remain one and indivisible and yet accord any degree of autonomy to the overseas territories. This was settled by proposing that the overseas territorial assemblies be thought of as equivalent to the *conseils* of the metropolitan department [646]
just as that of Senegal had been. The colonies, instead of forming a federation with France as proposed at the Brazzaville Conference, were to participate in a French Union much more integrationist in character and within

648 the assimilationist tradition. Once again, however, the implication of granting full citizenship to all colonials was 641 not faced, for the *loi Lamine Guèye* which extended citizenship to all French *sujets* without prejudice to their *statut personnel* did not in fact extend the right to vote to all of them. However it achieved much in abolishing the humiliating status of *sujet*. The *indigénat*, forced labour and the law against freedom of meeting and association were abolished. And a large scale development plan for overseas territories was projected. But although those Africans eligible to vote supported the new constitution, it was defeated in metropolitan France and the new Constituent Assembly proved to be much more conservative. A powerful group known as the States-General of Colonisation was formed in France with the object of reducing the effect of the concessions already granted to the overseas territories. It attacked the proposed French Union since its members believed that under it France would become a colony of its own colonies.

The second Constituent Assembly elected after the defeat of the first constitution was much less liberal in its attitude towards colonial affairs and as a result the new constitution it drew up was far from that envisaged by the Brazzaville C48 Conference. The structure of the French Union was integrationist. It was composed of the French Republic, which included on the one hand metropolitan France, the Overseas Departments and Territories, among them all the territories of French and Equatorial Africa and the associated states and territories, such as the mandated territories of Togo and Cameroons and the Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia on the other. The President of the French Republic would automatically become President of the French Union. The Assembly of the Union was to draw half its members from metropolitan France and half from the overseas territories. As to the composition of the High Council the concept of the wider French Republic was adopted for the choice of members who would share office with representatives of the associated states. Its powers were limited to consultation on matters affecting the overseas territories. 648

The integrationist character of the new constitution was clear from its preamble: 641 648

> France, together with the peoples of its overseas territories, forms a union based on the equality of rights and duties without distinction of race or religion. Faithful to its traditional mission France intends to lead the people she has taken into her charge towards freedom to administer themselves and to regulate their own affairs democratically, ruling out all methods of colonisation founded on arbitrary acts; she guarantees to all equal access to the public service as well as the individual and collective exercise of rights and liberties confirmed heretofore.

Under the new constitution French citizenship was extended on 7 May 1946 to all French colonial subjects; but in practice the franchise was limited to those whose political education was considered sufficient (e.g. ex-servicemen, civil servants, and the literate or wealthy, etc.), so that of all France's vast overseas population only 1½ million were given the vote. But a number of liberal features were retained. General Councils were established for each territory, though with dual colleges for all but Senegal so that European representation could be secured. Separate rolls were used for election to the Senate and the Assembly of the French Union though a single roll was used for the National Assembly. A Grand Council was established for the eight territories of French West Africa, with members elected by the individual General Councils whose powers were purely advisory and thus no greater than those of the old Senegalese General Council. [646] The constitutional position of Senegal itself was consequently little changed, except that there was no longer a major distinction between *sujet* and citizen. It still remained an integral part of the French Republic. The French Parliament, to which it sent two deputies, still had the final say on all questions of public liberty, and political and administrative organisation. The new General Council replaced the old Colonial [646]

648 641 Council in Senegal but differed little in competence. The
only concession made to Senegal and not to the other
[646] territories, and this undoubtedly being influenced by its
political history, was the retention of a single college
electorate as against the dual colleges prescribed for all
other territories. The French penal code was made generally
[671] applicable for Senegal. In January 1946 the three *communes
de pleine exercice* (Gorée had by then been incorporated in
[633] Dakar) were given full municipal status as equivalent French
towns. Finally and most important, forced labour was
[466] legally abolished; but it survived in covert forms for several
years to come. In Senegal, Senghor received the full credit
for this measure from his peasant electorate and has been
drawing political dividends from it ever since.

V. AFRICAN REACTION AGAINST ASSIMILATION

> I admit that as Negro students in the years 1930–4 we were only an obstruction. I admit that we were racialist; we were intoxicated by the banner of Negritude. At that time no intercourse was possible with Europeans. But since then, because this racialism betrayed our African-Negro humanism, because it led to deadlock by imposing cold war between races and continents, between man and man, we decided upon reflection to make an extra effort. Today we have accomplished this—the results of European decolonisation have contributed to it—we have left behind us the period of denial to embark with you upon the period of construction. [illegible]
>
> **Léopold Sédar Senghor**

THE 1946 constitution as far as Senegal and the other more advanced territories of French Africa were concerned really fell between two stools. In so far as it was assimilationist, it was not sufficiently so. If France were ever to establish her Franco-African republic it had to be on the basis of the equality implicit in assimilation. And this equality was denied at many turns. In so far as it permitted decentralisation in the form of territorial and federal assemblies, it was to encourage the growth of nationalist and regional politics. In Senegal, where the changes made were of relatively little importance, the failure to put into practice a fully assimilationist policy was to be one of the predominant influences behind the reaction against assimilation that was the distinguishing feature of the next decade of Senegalese politics. 648 [668]

Overseas leaders had been particularly disillusioned with French honesty in the application of the Overseas Labour Code. This code was drawn up at the Brazzaville Conference and promised amongst other things equal pay for equal work, 648 641 466

648 a forty hour week, a minimum wage, the development of
641 trade unions and the institution of a labour inspectorate.
466 However the second Constituent Assembly procrastinated
in according these economic rights to its overseas citizens
and was dissolved before it could bring them into force. It
was only in 1952 that the overseas deputies were able to
force this measure through.

648 One of the reasons for the break-up of the old *S.F.I.O.*
665 in 1948, which may be taken as symbolic of the reaction
against assimilation, was the attitude of the parent party
in France to social legislation for the overseas territories.
The *S.F.I.O.* had voted against equal pensions for African
[641] and metropolitan French veterans; it had voted against
the introduction of the French social security system for the
overseas departments, and it had abstained on a motion to
abolish the dual college system. But more important was
the desire of the newly enfranchised 'bush' peasants for
greater participation in the direction of party policy.
Hitherto the party, closely linked with the parent body in
France, had been tightly ruled by Lamine Guèye from
Dakar. At the 1947 Congress of the party a group of
members led by Senghor demanded a greater voice in
party councils. The people of the bush, so long denied
the rights accorded to the privileged of the *Quatre Communes*,
once enfranchised showed their resentment against both
(those who exercised these rights and those who granted
them. In the following year Senghor, backed not only by
the intellectuals but by the vast majority of the bush,
founded the *Bloc Democratique Sénégalais* (*B.D.S.*) declaring
that 'Assimilation is an illusion in a world whose people
have become aware of their own personality'. He attacked
the *S.F.I.O.* for its close ties with France and its failure to
take an independent line on African matters. So just as
Lamine Guèye has been described as the representative
[668] of the era of assimilation, so Senghor can be dubbed the
648 representative of reaction to this policy.

668 This reaction was at first not part of a concerted

movement, though by the late fifties it amounted to a definite 648
revolt against the basic assumption of an assimilationist 668
policy that there was nothing of worth in African culture
and that the greatest benefit France could bring to Africans
was to make them French. It was hardly surprising that
those to whom this policy had been most heavily applied
should be the first to react. Thus in political and cultural
affairs the Senegalese were in the vanguard of the campaign
for the recognition of the African personality, or in French
African terms *la négritude*. This new movement showed
itself in many fields. In politics it was to manifest itself in a [665]
rupture with the metropolitan French parties, and the assertion
of the necessity of the incorporation of traditional
African values into European-type political systems. On
the human plane it insisted on the dignity of the African,
the originality of his personality and his contribution to the
achievement of the human race. In the cultural field it
implied a return to the values of African art, which educated [532]
Africans until recently had themselves tended to reject.
As regards history, it denied the common European allegation
that Africans had no history and asserted that Africans
had in fact made a far greater contribution to world history
than was revealed in text books. Finally it was to produce
a picture of a suffering Africa, exploited and abused by
the white man, awakening slowly to a glorious day of freedom.

The policy of Senghor's new party, which was not allied 665
to any metropolitan party, was characteristic of this revolt. 668
Its declared aim was to promote a new form of African 648
socialism, related to the realities of the African situation.
Accordingly the party was to be organised to correspond
with the socio-ethnic structure of the country. It demanded
a greatly increased autonomy for Senegal and other African
countries, and whilst not demanding independence, a word
that did not touch the public lips of any major French African
politician for another ten years, it advocated a federal
relationship between France and her overseas territories.

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This move was the more surprising since Senghor was and is one of the most highly assimilated of French Africans. He was the first African to gain his *agrégation*. He was effectively the grammarian of the constitution of the Fourth Republic, and whenever there was a dispute as to the interpretation of the constitution in the National Assembly it was as often as not the second deputy of Senegal to whom the President of the Assembly referred for advice. As a member of a rich [633] family of merchants from Joal, a town which though not privileged like the *Quatre Communes*, had long-standing connexions with Europe, he had been able to pursue his education in France and became a professor there. He was well known in literary circles as a writer and poet. Indeed as those who have wished to malign him have since asserted, he seemed almost more French than the French. But, and it is an important but, his return to his African past, his sudden resentment of his own Frenchness and his search for virtue in the African personality was the result of his sudden realisation of the extent of his assimilation by France, though he himself has said that he assimilated, and was not assimilated. Perhaps his dilemma is best illuminated by the experience of Aimé Césaire, the High Priest of *négritude*, who as Senghor is always the first to admit, was his real source of inspiration for this return to the past. The story goes that Césaire, a West Indian living for long in Paris, and already distinguished as a man of letters, was travelling in a train, when he found himself sitting next to a black marine. His first racial reaction was that of a white man. This horrified him so much that he returned to his native West Indies to 'rediscover' himself, and wrote a series of poems, that have become as it were the hymns of *négritude*. Senghor subsequently became the fulcrum of the new movement to assert the uniqueness and value of the Negro personality. Ulli Beier, reviewing Senghor's poetry, has written: 'Senghor is not merely a Frenchified African who tries to give exotic interest to his French poems; he is an African who uses the French language to express his African soul.'

Those who have not come under the influence of a strong 648
assimilation policy have never had to assert their essential 668
négritude. Thus the English-speaking African, whose culture and traditional political organisation was largely left intact by the British administration, was rarely concerned about his identity as an African and until very recently this problem has been of little concern for the Nigerian or Ghanaian. It has never occurred to him to doubt his *négritude*. There are of course a number of examples of what may be called assertion of the African personality in the English-speaking territories, but the cult of *négritude* never caught on in them as it did in Senegal and the other French territories.

Thus it was that the very Africans who had achieved the greatest distinction within the French cultural framework were to be the first to champion a return to the African past in search of their own essential personality. Thus it was that for long Paris became the cultural capital of Africa, for there the books and magazines were published in which they could tell the public of their new ideas. Whilst in the late forties and early fifties the British West African *évolué* was more concerned with the achievement of political independence from Britain, the French African *évolué* was [665] more concerned with his cultural emancipation. Senghor's formation of a new political party is more interesting for the emphasis it lays on its reassertion of African values than for any proposed political rupture with France.

The reaction against assimilation, as P. Mercier has 668
pointed out in *Elites Sénégalaises*, came essentially from the new educated generation.

> It is the elite that has given expression to this desire for a return to [571]
> the fountain head . . . From an acceptance of assimilation characteristic of the preceding generation opinion turned first to less sharply defined positions—typified by the slogan 'assimilate, don't be assimilated'—and then the attitudes of refusal, the details of which are still not very clear. Such attitudes accompany a lush ideological growth, to which only a very brief reference can be

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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668 against the society (which he has so brilliantly elucidated)—where do I stand in relation to that culture?'

Alioune Diop declared:

> Assimilation corresponds to a type of human relationship imposed by colonisation. It demands that the individual (for it affects only individuals) tear himself from his natural context and he who cannot assert his own personality must replace his habits of thinking, feeling and acting by others which he would only share with a foreign community.

By the time of this congress the Senegalese, as well as other Africans, had examined pretty thoroughly the whole question of French assimilation. For instance, A. Wade, a Senegalese, in a paper entitled 'Must Africa evolve a [671] positive law?', protested against the use in his country of a foreign legal system evolved in a different social context and which could not meet all the requirements of traditional society. He called for a new legal system which would be in effect a synthesis of African customary law and French law. In another article he called for a reform of teaching methods in Africa in the light of local conditions. There [571] were few stones this anti-assimilationist élite left unturned in their efforts to re-establish the values of the African past. They presented a dramatic contrast with the élite of the pre-war generation who, like the young men in Ousmane Socé Diop's *Karim*, so readily accepted the virtues of Western ways.

668 648 Amongst this group were a number who fell back not on the values of the African past so much as Marxist theories in their attacks on colonialism and assimilationist policy. Principal amongst this group was Majhemout Diop, leader of the pro-Communist *Parti Africain de l'Indépendence*. [665] In issue No. 14 of *Présence Africaine* he attacked colonialism bitterly:

> There is no possible ambiguity; colonisation equals capitalistic enterprise. Any other explanation is invalid, is deceitful, a myth, a myth of civilisation and of co-operation.
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> A coloniser cannot be humanitarian . . . that would be the

> most irreducible of paradoxes. Colonisation is always measured 668
> in terms of gain for the coloniser. 648
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> Between colonialist and colonial there is room only for forced labour, intimidation, pressure, police, theft, rape, obligatory farming, scorn, mistrust, arrogance, self-conceit, deceit, suppressed élites and debased masses.
>
> No human relationship but a relationship based on domination and submission which transform the coloniser into a pawn, an adjutant, a warder, a flogger and the native into an instrument of production.

The resentment of assimilation is the same. But the interpretation is a Marxist one and the remedies subsequently offered by Majhemout Diop were non-African in origin. His *Contribution to the Study of Political Problems in Black Africa* is almost entirely Marxist in inspiration and the source matter, abundantly evident from the footnotes, is the work of Stalin, Lenin, Engels and Marx, none of whom had any first-hand knowledge of economic conditions in Africa. Another Senegalese, of very distinguished academic reputation, who uses Marxist techniques in his studies of African problems, is Ly Abdoulaye, an economic historian [814] who nevertheless is much more inclined to take into account African circumstances in the application of Marxist theories. Indeed Ly is at great pains to avoid Marxist terminology even when employing Marxist ideas. There are in fact few Senegalese intellectuals who are not in some sense Marxist socialists. But more especially they are devotees of what they call African socialism.

In the search for identity that followed the application of 668 assimilationist policy, the first tendency was to rehabilitate African culture. Naturally political rehabilitation was one of the most important goals for politicians like Senghor. But when he broke with the *S.F.I.O.* in 1948, he gave as [665] one of his reasons that French socialism, like Communism, after all, 'did not understand our problems, and wanted to solve them with a plan devised by and for Europe'. His proposed alternative of 'African socialism' was at the time in this sense, it had to be agreed by everyone and the 668 discussion would not end until agreement was reached. Thus in the modern African society there would be real justification for a one-party state, for in theory no one could be against the Government, since by adopting traditional African methods, all would be agreed to any given course of action. Furthermore Africans already had their own built-in socialism. In the village no one could go hungry. And by an elaborate set of social laws and customs he who had invariably ended by sharing his possessions with those who had not. Above all, Africans could bring to the world this harmony of traditional African society where agreement was reached by all on every political decision, and where a voluntary socialism was already practised—what Senghor described as 'la sagesse africaine'. If Africa had something to bring to the modern world, it was this special political experience.

Despite this intense reaction to France's assimilationist 648 policy by the Senegalese élite, for long no one openly voiced 668 the logical conclusion of such attacks—the demand for total independence. Up until 1958 the most extreme official demand was for a federal constitution in which the African territories could develop along their own lines and have equal political rights with France. But in France, African students were impatient of constitutional niceties which seemed to them to avoid the one and only issue—that of putting an end to colonialism. In 1952 *Présence Africaine* [204] published a special supplement in which African students, mostly Senegalese, made themselves more than clear on this issue. And whilst it is true that students tend to be much more extreme in their political attitudes than those actually exercising power, amongst the writers in this special supplement were some who were to have considerable influence on the political situation in Senegal as representatives of the young anti-colonialist generation, such as Assane Seck and Majhemout Diop. The latter in his call for immediate, unequivocal and absolute independence was in fact not

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representative of the main stream of student feeling. Rather it was summed up by Kader Fall in his article 'The Problem of the Elite in Black Africa' in which he concluded: 'The African people, after centuries of colonisation, has a right to demand that its more intelligent members should participate at his side and together in the elaboration of a new world which will see the end of colonial servitude.'

VI. TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

> **The choice of the Senegalese people is independence; they want it to take place only in friendship with France, not in dispute.** 080
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> **Léopold Sédar Senghor (September 1958)**

It was not until 1951 that Senghor was able to test the 665
strength of his new party at the elections for the French 666
National Assembly in which it gained both seats with [646]
213,000 votes to the *S.F.I.O.*'s 90,000. His success was proved the next year when he won forty-one out of the fifty seats in the *Conseil-General* under the new and greatly enlarged franchise. His vote came overwhelmingly from the 'bush', since Lamine Guèye still retained strong support in Dakar and St. Louis. The party ticket was a popular one: accusing the French Administration of supporting socialists in the towns and chiefs in the bush.

From a theoretical standpoint as we have seen the *B.D.S.* fitted into the new anti-assimilationist trend in Senegal. It represented the 'unsophisticated' bush against the Gallicised *citoyens* of the *Quatre Communes*. It demanded a return to African values and had an essentially African-style organisation in the bush. But few real differences showed themselves on the platforms adopted by the two parties at the elections.

In the French National Assembly Senghor had joined 648
forces with a number of other deputies from African terri- 665
tories who like himself did not wish to link themselves with one of the metropolitan parties. This group was known as the *Indépendants d'Outre Mer*. As a result of the elections the *I.O.M.* gained thirteen seats, enough to form a recognised group in the National Assembly. However they were never able to mould themselves into a united federal party on the lines of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (*R.D.A.*)

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which had been founded by M. Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast in 1946 and which had branches in all African territories. This party had been closely aligned with the Communists from which it adopted many ideas including its cellular structure, but it was temporarily suppressed by French administrative action because of its extreme and violent tactics, especially in the Ivory Coast. It had however by 1952 broken with the Communists, but in its weakened state it might have found it difficult to rival a well organised *I.O.M.* which was more than just a group of individuals with like ideas. However at their conference at Bobo Dioulasso the *I.O.M.* failed once more to form the necessary federal organisation to compete with either the *R.D.A.* or *S.F.I.O.* as a Pan-African party. Nevertheless the *I.O.M.* were able to play an increasingly importan[illegible]le in the National Assembly in the formation of delic[illegible]e French government coalitions and were often able to extract as the price of their support concrete returns in the form of aid.

In Senegal the political scene remained calm until the 1956 elections to the National Assembly when the *B.D.S.* came out with what by French African standards was a nationalist programme. As Kenneth Robinson remarks in his admirable study of this and the 1957 elections to the territorial assembly in *Five Elections in Africa*, 'among politically conscious West Africans there has undoubtedly been for several years increasing nationalist feeling, a mood more and more outspokenly hostile to colonial rule, less and less interested in the refinements of juridical forms, more impatient of reformist schemes, and more and more determined that Africans must be masters in their own house'. Thus the *B.D.S.* put strong emphasis on autonomy within a federal association with France. The *B.D.S.* won both seats, with the socialists still strong in the *Quatre Communes*. But on the federal West African level, the *I.O.M.* had done badly and Houphouët Boigny's *R.D.A.*, now purged of its connexions with Communism, a purge

that involved the breaking-away of a number of small 648
sections in various territories, emerged as West Africa's [665]
leading party with nine seats, and joined the Guy Mollet
Government. Under this Government the famous *loi cadre*
was passed establishing for each of the black African [646]
territories a wholly elected assembly, based on universal [641]
adult suffrage. An executive, that could be drawn from
within or without the assembly, was established. Although [643]
the territorial Governor presided over it, it was effectively guided by the Vice-President or Prime Minister. Separate rolls for Europeans were abolished. Thus in one fell swoop all African territories were given the elements of responsible democratic government. Certainly their powers were restricted since a large number of subjects were reserved to the Federation, still run by the French High Commissioner, and checked only by the *Grand Conseil*. The *loi cadre*, whilst it did not envisage independence, and still saw the future of the African territories as within the structure of the French body politic, did in effect set these territories on the road to independence. Senghor, an ardent critic of the *loi cadre*, declared: 'The peoples of Africa do not intend to cut themselves off from metropolitan France; they want to be able to construct, side by side with her, their own buildings which will consolidate and extend French territory.'

The *loi cadre*, whilst it made large concessions to African demands for autonomy, was in fact designed to avoid demands for independence. The new French Government had been influenced to this end by France's unfortunate experiences in other parts of her empire as well as the political progress of the Gold Coast. Furthermore she wished to anticipate moves by the Gold Coast to absorb that part of the former German Togo which she administered and therefore accorded it a limited form of internal autonomy. It was inevitable that having granted this concession to Togo she would eventually have to make it to neighbouring French African territories as well. Whilst considerable

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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648 powers were devolved on the individual territories, it is clear that a desire to avoid any ultimate break-up of the French Union was one of the main factors behind the emasculation of the federal executive. French West Africa as a federation might soon be demanding independence; eight small territories on their own would find it a more daunting prospect.

Senghor attacked France vigorously for what he called the balkanising of French Africa by devolving powers on individual territories and at the same time making no provision for an executive at the federal level. The *Grand Conseil* retained only its limited legislative powers. Executive [646] action for the federation was still undertaken by the High Commissioner, representing the Republic. By thus turning politics towards the individual territories, France was 'balkanising' the federation, following the classic pattern of dividing in order to rule. Bitterly, he accused the French of offering Africa 'sucettes et bonbons'. It may seem odd that the role of defending the federation should have [665] fallen on Senghor, who had already failed to convert the *I.O.M.* from an association of deputies into a Pan West African political party. But though the R.D.A. was officially a Pan-African party, its leader came from the rich Ivory Coast, and disliked intensely the ideas of sharing his country's wealth with his many poorer neighbours. He was instrumental in securing the form of *loi cadre* that avoided the creation of a supra-government. On the other hand it might be argued that it was in Senegal's interest to ensure that the federation did not break up, since one of [633] Dakar's *raisons d'être* was as a federal capital. But Senghor argued cogently that only with a strong West Africa, containing twenty million people, could Africans participate with any sense of political equality and weight of personality with France in the proposed Franco-African Community. 'Within the framework of a French federal republic, a French West Africa of 20 million inhabitants can, side by side with the metropolis, form a stable element and develop its own personality.'

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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develop its own personality.' The *S.F.I.O.* parties of Africa met in Conakry to found a new socialist party entirely African in basis, called the *Mouvement Socialiste Africain*. Thus after over twenty years Lamine Guèye officially broke one of Senegal's closest links with France. At the same time Senghor called a congress of his allies in other territories from the *I.O.M.* and formed a federal party called the *Convention Africaine*. There were thus three new major African parties, with sections in most of the eight territories of West Africa and some in *A.E.F.*, each preaching African unity. But the federal executive, the very structure through which this could be maintained, was missing. 648 665

At the *loi cadre* elections that took place at the end of March 1957, the *R.D.A.*, the most thoroughly organised on the ground, proved the strongest party of the three and in West Africa and gained overwhelming majorities in Soudan, Guinea and Ivory Coast, dominated the coalition in Upper Volta and provided the opposition in Niger and Dahomey. But the party, as was soon proved at the long delayed Bamako Conference of September 1957, was far from united. Its main difference was over the problem of the federal executive. Its President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast had, as a Minister in the French Government, been one of the principal architects of the *loi cadre* and was opposed to the creation of a federal executive. The *R.D.A.*'s very dynamic Vice-President, Sékou Touré of Guinea, formed in the tough school of trade unionism, however championed the creation of a federal executive, and in this respect he was closer to Senghor than to his own party chief. At the Bamako Conference Sékou Touré persuaded the party to adopt it as a prime objective. [666]

Meanwhile in Senegal, ever the source of new things, was born the first African party with the avowed object of independence, the *P.A.I.* (*Parti Africain de l'Indépendance*) led by Majhemout Diop, who had strong Communist sympathies. Till then the word independence had been [668]

648 665 [668] studiously avoided not only by Senegalese but by nearly all leading French African politicians. The official formula was the creation of a Franco-African community, in which Africans would have fully autonomous states (or federations if Senghor and Sékou Touré had their way) and matters like defence and foreign affairs would be shared between France and the other member states. As far as the Senegalese were concerned their long attachment to France, despite their reaction against assimilationism, made it difficult to countenance the idea of complete separation. As Senghor always put it, 'fédérer n'est pas séparer.' Furthermore [651] French aid to West Africa in general and Senegal in particular had been enormous.

The Senegalese thesis on federation made headway in the early months of 1958. After several meetings between the major African parties, the *Convention Africain* and the *M.S.A.* met in Dakar in March and formed the new *Parti du Regroupement Africain*, with the aim of obtaining Federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa, which in turn would be federated with France in the proposed Franco-African community. On 5 April 1958 the *P.R.A.* members of the *Grand Conseil*, plus the *R.D.A.* members, voted in favour of the creation of a federal executive; the only Ivory Coast delegate abstained.

Despite bitterness over the question of the federal [668] executive, there was still little open talk about independence except by the *P.A.I.* and this despite the example of Ghana. This situation was to be abruptly changed by the *putsch* of the military in Algiers on 13 May.

648 In presenting his new constitution for the Fifth Republic to the French people, de Gaulle made it a straight choice of Yes or No. As far as the French were concerned this was a reasonable choice. Acceptance or rejection. Once rejected, there was the possibility of trying again as they had done in 1946. But as far as the overseas territories were concerned, they were given no alternative. They either accepted the constitution, whose details we shall examine

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shortly, or rejected it and took what de Gaulle described as independence with all its consequences. Under the constitution France and her overseas territories were to form a Franco-African Community in which each territory would become an autonomous republic, but would pool certain matters such as defence, foreign affairs, currency and higher education in the Executive Council of the Community. Thus once again we have the traditional French dilemma over assimilation, this time in its most acute form. Once again we have the paradox of an authoritarian regime introducing liberal reforms. On the one hand de Gaulle's Franco-African Community satisfied assimilationist theory by creating a supreme institution, the Senate of the Community, and a supreme executive, the Council of the Community, in which France and Africa would participate on roughly equal terms, whilst on the other hand he conceded a great degree of autonomy to all the overseas territories. Furthermore de Gaulle offered, albeit with little grace, independence to any territory that cared to take it—an offer that had hitherto never been considered by French politicians. This actually tied in with a growing resentment in France against the cost of the colonies. From 1946-1958 France had spent in the form of aids and subsidies over £400 million in French West Africa alone. Much of this money was spent on lavish schemes often of dubious economic worth. In France many people, particularly after a series of articles in *Paris-Match* by Raymond Cartier, began to question the worth of colonies which cost so much and whose leaders seemed to them so ungrateful for all they received. This attitude received the nickname of *Cartierisme*.

Judging by earlier statements of both Senegalese and other African politicians the *loi cadre* might well seem to have been a liberal solution to the problem of small poor countries economically and culturally linked to France. But already Ghana had gained her independence, and Nigeria was scheduled for it in 1960. In Senegal resentment against the nature of the *loi cadre* and the large number of students

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648 returning from France imbued with anti-colonialist ideas
668 made the issue of independence a burning one. Yet the
difficulty of making a complete break with her cultural
parents was made clear by Joseph Ma Thiam, a member
of F.E.A.N.F. (Federation of Students from French Black
Africa) who wrote: 'We are not anti-French, that would be
ridiculous and impossible. We are simply Africans and we
want not minor reforms, called *loi-cadre* or Community,
but a revolution of which the necessary outcome will be
independence, as this is conceived of and put into practice
in the twentieth century.'

For the Senegalese leaders, as indeed for other African
leaders, the choice was a difficult one. The idea of sudden
rupture with France, which de Gaulle's choice implied,
was not only economically terrifying, but rather like the
impending break-up of a family. So many of the leaders
had lived so much of their lives in Paris that the prospect of
such imminent separation was difficult to contemplate. It
665 is against this background that the conference of the *P.R.A.*
668 at Cotonou from 25-27 July 1958 must be seen. Here dele-
648 gates met to consider the situation created by the projected
new constitution. At that stage the terms of the constitution
were not clearly known, though it was general knowledge
that they would not be favourable to the idea of total
independence. At the conference delegates were carried
away by demands for independence and voted for 'Immediate
independence; the creation of a solid and progressive
African Community; and negotiation with France
for the creation of a multi-national confederation of free
and equal peoples.' The last two items were in accord with
current Senegalese feeling that federation was the only way
to secure equality of the African personality in a Franco-
African Community. But the morrow of the conference saw
a number of delegates reflecting on the demand for immediate
independence. The rupture seemed too abrupt and,
as Mamadou Dia pointed out, they did not even know the
terms of the new constitution. He expressed doubts on

the ability of Senegal to accede immediately to independence. 665
In certain territories, particularly in Senegal and 668
Dahomey, pressure was brought to bear by France on the 648
delegates against taking so drastic a step, so that the *P.R.A.* withdrew from its earlier stand and said that effectively the decision over the constitution would be left to each territorial section. In August the burning question for both the *P.R.A.* and *R.D.A.* was answered by General de Gaulle on his tour of Africa prior to the referendum in September. The right of independence would be inscribed in the constitution. But, he later added ominously, those who voted No to his constitution now would take all the consequences. For all states so economically dependent on France this was a considerable threat. Thus few leaders did in fact campaign against the constitution. In Guinea, Sékou Touré with a superb party organisation, managed to obtain a 97 per cent vote against the constitution and took independence with all its consequences, which involved the French destroying all their files and even taking away the telephones! In Niger the Premier, Djibo Bakary failed to carry his campaign against the constitution, and was forced reluctantly to resign, and after the subsequent election which was won by his *R.D.A.* opponents, to flee the country. In this matter it was said, the French who suspected Djibo Bakary of extreme left-wing sympathies were determined not to have 'a hole in the desert'.

In Senegal the situation was confused. Not until the last minute did the *P.R.A.* come out definitely in favour of the constitution. De Gaulle received a hostile reception on his visit to Dakar. Three radical members of the *P.R.A.* Ly Abdoulaye, Assane Seck and Amadou M. M'Bow declared they would vote No, whatever the rest of the Party decided. On 11 December the *P.R.A.* section of the Senegal party decided to vote Yes. The three members who had declared they would vote No resigned, formed a new party confusingly called *P.R.A.-Sénégal* and joined with the *P.A.I.* and campaigned against de Gaulle. Once the decision of the

648 668 [665] majority party had been made, however, there was little doubt as to the outcome of the Referendum. But the seeds of independence had been sown.

Almost immediately after the Referendum the planners got down to work seeking to create the federal executive that had escaped them under the *ancien régime*. Guinea meanwhile had become independent and there was a certain satisfaction amongst those who voted Yes at the difficulties so abrupt a break with France entailed. Alas, as was later realised, Guinea independent and the rest still within the Community, meant the first crack in the old federation. On 29 December delegates from Senegal, Soudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey, together with observers from Mauretania, met to consider the possibility of creating a new federation.

On 17 January 1959 a federal constitution was promulgated with the accord of all four governmental delegations, and the new Mali came into being. However pressures from France and from Houphouët-Boigny, who still bitterly opposed any form of federation, soon forced Upper Volta and Dahomey to withdraw, reducing Mali to two member states: Senegal and Soudan.

648 665 The new federation was short lived. In Soudan there had been almost unanimous support for the federation, but in Senegal a number of religious chiefs, in association with Ibrahim Seydou N'Daw, formerly President of the Senegalese Assembly, and an important member of the governing *U.P.S.* party, formed the Senegalese Solidarity Party and together with the two left-wing parties, the *Parti Africain de l'Indépendence* and the *P.R.A.*—Senegal campaigned [666] against the proposed federation. At the polls the Government won a resounding victory.

Thus in both Senegal and Soudan the leaders who had chosen the path of federation won triumphant approval, though as Mamadou Dia admits somewhat ruefully, the people followed their leaders blindly on this question. It is essential here to note that the two countries were governed by different parties, and in each territory that party held all the parliamentary seats. In any election to the Federal Assembly, which was by nomination of each territorial house of an equal number of seats, there could well be deadlock. However on 24 March 1959 Soudanese and Senegalese met in Dakar to form the new African Federalist Party, to which delegates from Niger and Dahomey came. The new party was formed, then, from the *R.D.A.* of Soudan, the *U.P.S.* which was the official Senegal Section of P.R.A., which in effect contained both *M.S.A.* and *Convention Africaine* as well as the small Senegal *R.D.A.* the Niger *P.R.A.* (in effect *M.S.A.*) and the Dahomey *P.R.A.* Thus, with the exception of the small *P.R.A.-Sénégal* and the small *P.A.I.*, Mali had only one effective party. This detailed composition shows that the Mali Federation could not then be called a one-party state. Indeed the local politicians described their party as a 'unified party', which admitted opposition outside the party as well as within. 648 665

From the start the Mali Federation ran into difficulties with France, which initially refused to recognise her existence. Thus Modibo Keita did not attend the first three meetings of the executive council of the Community because of this failure to recognise the State of which he was head. However de Gaulle soon realised that Mali was there to stay and gave her recognition and Modibo Keita attended the fourth meeting of the Community Executive at Tananarive in Madagascar. It was not long before the leaders of Mali decided to take advantage of the clause in the constitution which apparently allowed members of the Community to become independent and yet remain members. For long the French Government would not commit itself to granting independence, and only when the question was raised at the sixth meeting of the Community Executive at St. Louis in Senegal on 13 December did de Gaulle give it his blessing. But there followed long and protracted negotiations over the terms of independence, 648

C48 the main drawback for Mali being the concessions she had to make over the military base at St. Louis. Far from cutting [651] Mali off without a penny as she had Guinea, France promised to continue her aid. Mali's decision to take independence marked the beginning of the end of the Franco-African Community, and indeed of France's political assimilation of her African states.

This done, the Mali Federation was all set for independence. But there were internal hurdles to overcome. Mali may well have been ruled by a unified party, but there were definite differences between Soudanese and Senegalese. Soudan was the larger, more populous territory, but the poorer. It was much more left wing and politically was run very much more strictly than Senegal. The party [665] controlled everything. To appreciate this one must remember that the *R.D.A.* was initially allied to the Communists and had adopted their cell technique for its own party organisation. This system of administration proved most effective and explains why Sékou Touré was able to keep so firm a hold on Guinea after the French had gone. Senegal, however, after three centuries of contact with the [641] French, was much more affected by French ideas of liberty and certainly found this rather ruthless element in its Soudanese partner disturbing. For instance at the constitutional conference preceding independence the Soudanese demanded that a unitary state be created, and that the excess burden of two territorial governments be removed. They also wanted a president with strong powers like those enjoyed by de Gaulle. The Senegalese, who saw many dangers to themselves in such a constitution protested successfully on the moral grounds that it would prevent other states from joining Mali—which was after all the federation's main *raison d'être*. The Senegalese won the day after bitter wrangling. Of course, though Senegal as the richer partner effectively subsidised the federation, she had [439] her own interests in maintaining it since Soudan exported its ground-nuts along the railway from Bamako to Dakar.

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Certain left-wing elements in Soudan had already insinuated that if the Senegalese made trouble, they could easily build a railway line from Bamako to Kankan, the railhead in Guinea, or send their ground-nuts down the road to Bobo Dioulasso and thence by rail to Abidjan. If no Eastern bloc power were forthcoming to help them to do this, they said they could always do it by communal effort.

Despite these differences, independence was achieved on 20 June 1960. On the surface all seemed well. But there was in fact considerable tension and only two months after independence the federation broke up. Matters came to a head when Modibo Keita tried to remove Mamadou Dia, the Vice President, from his post as Minister of Federal Security and Armed Forces, a post the Senegalese felt it was necessary to hold as a guarantee for their participation in the federation. Modibo also tried to call out the army to assert his authority as President. Meanwhile, unknown to the Soudanese, Senghor and the Senegalese ministers had decided that the federation was unworkable in the circumstances and on the morning of 20 June, Modibo Keita and the other Soudanese ministers found themselves under house arrest and the whole of Dakar under the control of the *gendarmerie* and armed supporters of Senghor who had been brought in from the bush. The same day they were packed off by rail and air to Bamako. The details of the break-up need not concern us here. The reasons for it are confused. Each partner in the federation has its own version of the story. The contemporary vocabulary of political abuse has been used to the full by both partners ever since. What is important are not the machinations of one side against the other, but the fundamental defects in the federation. First of all the two states found it almost impossible to co-operate within the framework of an ill and hastily devised constitution. Second it was unfortunately a federation of only two states, meaning that with unbalance of population—Soudan was larger in size and population, but much poorer and

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

648 more backward in every way—one could try and dominate the other. Indeed Senegal felt she was subsidising Soudan whilst that territory, it was believed, was taking all the plum jobs. Third, in such a federation it was not surprising that there should be a clash of personalities between the two regional leaders, Senghor and Modibo Keita. They proved quite incompatible, each representing entirely different political traditions. And though nominally they now belonged to the same political party the *P.F.A.*, in fact they had entirely different outlooks. Modibo Keita represented a country of considerable poverty, with a very small educated élite, where ministers worked in the fields for three weeks each year. The population undertook voluntary labour on government projects. Altogether it was a puritan, left-wing regime anxious to lift its peoples out of their age-long poverty, intolerant of opposition and very ascetic in its approach to life.

[665] The Senegalese were almost entirely opposite in every way. Politically the *U.P.S.* was much more liberal, flanked on either side by extreme right-wing and extreme left-wing opposition parties. Indeed the *U.P.S.* itself was an amalgamation of two parties. Senegal by comparison, was much richer, the population less interested in the type of ascetic left-wing politics practised in Mali. But above all the conflict between the two came from their widely different political histories. Senegal had nearly 150 years' experience of European-style politics, Soudan barely fourteen. The conflict between the sophisticated communes and the neglected bush that had been instrumental in Senghor's foundation of the *B.P.S.* in 1948, seemed to be repeating itself in a new form. The Soudanese found it difficult to co-operate with their sophisticated neighbours who seemed to take politics and indeed life far less seriously than they did, who seemed too identified with France as a result of long contact and the latter's policy of assimilation. This conflict seemed to be embodied in the personalities of their two leaders. Senghor, poet, philosopher, political

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

theoretician, *agregé-ès-grammaire* from the Sorbonne, at home in any *salon* in Paris; from a middle class commercial family in long contact with Europe, seemed to sum up Senegal on the one hand; whilst Modibo Keita was an aristocrat—tracing his ancestry to the emperors of the great kingdom of Mali, a simple school teacher, with few intellectual pretensions. And so these two countries, so alike to the casual observer, were unable to co-operate, mainly for reasons of history. 648

The night before Senghor despatched the Mali ministers to Bamako, the Senegalese Assembly in an emergency session had declared Senegal an independent nation which subsequently applied for membership of the United Nations. Soudan, which now called itself the Mali Republic, left the Franco-African Community; Senegal decided to remain as an independent member. This was, however, very much a token gesture, for all members of the Community had now either taken independence or announced their intention of doing so. Several had left it altogether. Consequently it could no longer claim to be the Franco-African Community originally conceived by de Gaulle, and became instead a rather casual commonwealth. [646]

As an independent nation Senegal chose to retain close ties with France. Indeed her politicians and her whole social structure had been profoundly influenced by her long contact with that country, so that any radical rupture in relations such as Guinea had experienced and the Mali Republic at one stage appeared to contemplate, would have been quite out of character. The next three chapters will try to describe first what sort of society has evolved through this long contact and second what the Senegalese hope to do within their independence.

though few picked up their bags and left 'in disgust at the new order of things'. Of course in certain uninformed quarters there was the inevitable short-lived panic about what independence would mean for the French community, and even today, despite reassurances from the Government, certain sectors remain oversensitive to each move or speech made by a Minister. For many Frenchmen their stay in Senegal is not longer than five years, and as a result there is a higher proportion of bachelors than one would normally expect in a community that had intentions of making the country its permanent home. This proportion is largely accounted for by the presence of a French army base. 563 [648]

On the other hand the Dakar European population has none of the temporary character of the English communities in West Africa. Far from living in reservations outside the city, as is still the case with the European population of Lagos, they have moved into the centre of the town and made it a small corner of Europe, and the more the French population has increased the more it has tended to create a metropolitan life for itself in Africa. The range of European-style shops, the number of restaurants, night-clubs, and women's hairdressers shows that although the Dakar Frenchman may have no intention of settling in the city for good, he is determined to live his life in the maximum comfort during his stay. There is relatively little of the attitude of living for the next leave. 563 369

Another distinguishing feature of the European community in Senegal is that not only is it not a true settler community but also its economic interests, whilst vast, have not involved any important alienation of land and until very recently have not brought it into conflict with African economic interests. Dakar can in no way be considered a small Algiers. The majority of Europeans, whose per capita income is about £600 a year, are employed by the Administration or commercial and industrial undertakings in executive posts or in technical and clerical positions [463]

those who have been influenced by the barrage of anti- 563
colonial and especially anti-French propaganda that has [208]
been current in Africa during the last two years. Many
young men declare that the best thing they can do is to get
rid of the French since the economy is being strangled or
alternatively dominated by their former colonial masters.
But this does not reflect a deep-seated dislike for France as
such, indeed the opposite is nearer the case. The young man 648
who is demanding the expulsion of the French in a heated 563
moment today, may well be packing his bag to go and find
work in France tomorrow. Once again, this division is
removed when one suggests that the young Senegalese may
be against the French as such in Dakar, but this does not
imply that he is against either individual Frenchmen—he
may well count a number amongst his personal friends—
or against France and what France stands for from the
point of view of culture and civilisation. Like all those
who have led the anti-assimilationist campaign since the
war, he is also aware of the dominating role French culture
still plays in his daily life. And the wish to remove the
French from Dakar may be considered an attempt to
compensate for a psychological domination he resents rather
than as a reaction against the French community for any-
thing they may have done.

The real danger will come if the younger generation 563
becomes economically frustrated by the French community,
a situation which could lead to real racial tension. And it is
this again that the Senegalese Government in its present
planning intends to avert. The Senegalese leaders at present
in power believe that it is their role to show how various
racial groups can live together in harmony. Here it is
essential to remember that Senegal has three other sub-
stantial racial minorities, the Cape Verdians, Lebanese, [162]
and Mauretanians of Arab stock, but they are not important
for the purposes of this study which is primarily concerned
with the effects of assimilation on the indigenous Senegalese.

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37

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Ghana and Sierra Leone, together with articles on these territories that had appeared in the major British papers.

Monsieur Cros told us that he was going that evening to a 'lunch' at the Grand Conseil building, which was being held in honour of the Secretary-General of the French National Assembly. He promised to arrange invitations for us.

Every important official and politician in Dakar was present at the 'lunch'. Black and white mingled freely. M. Cros whisked me from Governor to Inspector General, from an African Colonel to the Secretary-General of the National Assembly, to a representative of Agence France Press and a Senegalese Minister I was to meet the next day. The scene was high-powered and bewildering, but after a few drinks had been consumed the party lost much of its formality, a thing the French, especially in Africa, do not believe in, and I was pulled into conversation by an elderly French Administrator with sleek grey hair, a well-preserved figure, piercing grey eyes, and bronzed complexion. He asked me what I was doing in Dakar.

'I am spending six months travelling in West Africa.'

'Where are you going?'

'I hope to visit most of French West Africa, and spend some time in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone. I've already been to Gambia and Portuguese Guinea.'

'How do you like Dakar?'

'I was here two years ago. But even in my short absence, it's changed so much. This Grand Conseil was just a mass of scaffolding and concrete when I was last here.'

We both looked at the marbled floor, the graceful pillars, at the group of superbly dressed Africans, many of them with better dress sense than the Frenchmen they were talking to.

'Yes,' he said, suddenly giving words to a sequence of thought, 'It's a revolution, a veritable revolution.'

POLITICS AND POWER

Dakar

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Obviously the young man talking to Arnold did not agree. He told him in English: 'We'll have to drive the French out of

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648 West Africa, or they'll never leave. The Frenchman has taken everything away from the African. Even prostitution,' he sneered, 'is in their hands.'

Arnold asked him what he thought about Ghana. 'Ghana,' he said fiercely, as though to him it was a deeply significant symbol, 'will stand on its own feet, despite the ill-will of the whole world.' Arnold said: 'But I heard some of your African politicians don't want independence on the Ghana pattern. I've even been told that one said that Ghana got its independence too early.'

'Huh!' he interjected. 'They are jealous because Ghana has got what we will never get, unless they take up arms and drive the Frenchmen away like they did in Dien Bien Phu and are now doing in Algeria.'

Quite why the young man was so vicious against the French I did not discover. His conversation with Arnold certainly gave a false impression of the political situation in French West Africa. He seemed almost as unaware of the political revolution that had taken place here in the Senegal, and throughout French Black Africa only six months earlier, as most British Africans are. For
[641] on 31st March, in the same month as Ghana got its independence, French West Africans, every adult, went to the polls to elect their own Territorial Assemblies, from which their own Prime Ministers and Governments would be chosen. And although the new law provided only for a limited degree of internal autonomy for each territory—control of the Civil Service and the police,
[643] for instance, were reserved for the Governor—it was an irrevocable step that placed the future of French West Africa in African hands. If the young man had doubts about this, he had only to look at the African Minister from the Senegal talking calmly and confidently to the Acting High Commissioner, Monsieur Torre, to reassure himself.

This young African was not alone in his views. I heard it from other students, though never from a politician in power. The French, of course, because of their record in Indo-China and North Africa, often hear such attacks from the Americans who write about French Black Africa. They arrive there, their opinions already formed by a study of French Colonial policy elsewhere, and condemn everything going on in Dakar and the eight

territories of the Federation. This has made the French very bitter 648
against the Americans. As it is, the French are notoriously anti-American, and nowhere was this more pronounced than in Dakar when I was there. Memories of the incident at Little Rock were still fresh. One official told me triumphantly:

'When Holmes, Foster Dulles' plenipotentiary, came to Dakar to patch up the effect of Little Rock, which, I might say, had a profound effect on Africans here, the local people told him that they were astonished that the Federal Government of the U.S.A. could not control a State Governor. Of course,' he continued, a vicious light in his eyes, 'the best thing was at the Youth Conference at Abidjan, in Ivory Coast. The local American Consul went there in his large car, Stars and Stripes flying. When these young Africans talked about independence he clapped, and smiled when they passed resolutions in its favour. Then they called for a vote censuring Little Rock. He had to get up and leave!'

After meeting the young African at the 'lunch' in the Grand 665
Conseil, Arnold was very surprised by the moderate views of 648
Monsieur Doudou Guèye, a leading politician of French Africa's largest party, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine, whom we met in his office in the same building. He is President of the Permanent Commission of the Grand Conseil, and a man with a record much more extremist than Nkrumah. He received us in a large office, overlooking the Atlantic, immaculately dressed and radiating an air of efficiency.

'In French West Africa,' he told us, 'independence is not so simple as in British West Africa, where you have practised indirect rule, preserving much of the old tribal system, the power of the Chiefs, and native law. Here most of that is destroyed. We have had to build up a new life for ourselves. Independence is therefore much more difficult. Anyway I don't think Ghana has much advantage over us. Our new *Loi Cadre* has given internal responsibility to the Africans who, in effect, run everything. The main strings France pulls are economic.'

It all seemed so smooth now, very remote from the fiery words of Arnold's friend. But Doudou Guèye, like many of his party, had been persecuted by the French. He had been in prison during the years 1948, 1949 and 1950. He did not seem bitter

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about it, and even waved a letter at me which he said he had just received from his old prison governor.

'If we politicians hadn't been in prison we would never have got what we have today. Other politicians who did not go to prison suffered more than I did.'

He seemed to take a far more mature view of his party's experience of prison than Nkrumah and his 'prison graduates' do. One could see that Doudou Guèye would never parade on French West African Independence Day in a prisoner's hat. Though he and his party members would have much more reason to.

Later we met a leader of R.D.A., with a record much more extreme than that of Doudou Guèye. Gabriel D'Arboussier, Vice-President of the Grand Conseil, had once been as good as a member of the Communist Party. The R.D.A., too, had been very much a fellow-travelling party, which even now is organized on the Communist cell basis. 'We owe a lot to the Communists, who taught us and trained us,' Doudou Guèye had told us. But D'Arboussier, a mulatto from Djenne in Soudan, is no longer a Communist, and R.D.A. has moved steadily away from the left. The Communists hate D'Arboussier today as a traitor to the cause, but this has lost him little, for he is now at the forefront of French African politics.

He received us in his plush office, sat us both in large armchairs, and instead of viewing us from the fortress of his very large desk, sat in the third armchair. He talked in fluent and excellent English. We talked about Africa.

'The great problem of Africa is the creation of a united people and the breakdown of tribal factions. When we stress the need for unity in Africa, I think it is because consciously or unconsciously in Africa it is clear to us that the element of division is very great. We shall have to fight very hard to achieve it.' Arnold: 'Do you think we will ever succeed?' D'Arboussier looked doubtfully at us for a moment. I said I thought that the impact of the various Colonial powers in Africa and the imposition of their culture and tradition in the African peoples would make unity difficult, at least in the immediate future. He nodded agreement.

'What is important,' D'Arboussier said, 'is the African way of

living. What we must preserve completely is that, though, of 665
course, I realize, it is no longer possible to treat the economic and 648
political problems of Africa on the level of the tribes. However, what Africa could give to the West, is the sense of democratic function. People tend to laugh at the institution of the village [623]
palaver house, but it is the great school of politics. Decisions there are taken on the basis not of a majority but of unanimity. They will talk night and day till the last man in the village is convinced their common action is right.'

Arnold looked at D'Arboussier somewhat suspiciously when he talked largely about the 'African' and his personality. As a Creole, Arnold, I think, detected D'Arboussier's own dilemma, as a Mulatto, who was not sure where he belonged. To Africa or Europe?

For a man who had once been a Communist sympathizer D'Arboussier was surprisingly moderate. There was no talk of independence or an immediate rupture with France.

'We have decided that absolute independence would be a burden,' he told me.

One of my best friends in Dakar was a young Toucouleur, of my own age, who was a member of the newly formed Partie Africane de L'Independence, which was in complete opposition to the creation of any Franco-African Community, who believed that France exploited Africa, and the sooner Africa was rid of her the better.

He himself was extremely well-educated, with no immediately obvious motive for bitterness against the French. Indeed, it was a Frenchman who introduced me to him. He took me to the headquarters of the party, a small bookshop in a side street of Dakar. It was well decorated, and its shelves were lined with books on Marxist Socialism and Communism, a lesser Colletts. Mixed with picture books about Rumania and Russia and the Chinese way of life were the French Classics. Mahjemout Diop, one of the leaders of this party, as yet with little influence, received me in his office and lectured me on the evils of French administration. There was something clandestine about our encounter in this side office and yet with Africans in power at the Grand Conseil, and with an African Prime Minister of the Senegal I could not help thinking his anti-colonialist crusade a

665 little misguided. He handed me a copy of the party manifesto.
648 On the front it read:

> 'At the historic moment of Bandung and of the Colonial and Imperialist system, at the moment when political confusion submerges Black Africa under French domination, our duty as Africans obliges us to bring before the masses of our country the problem of national independence and the transformation of our economy into a socialist economy.'

[204] He also handed me a copy of the party newspaper, *La Lutte*, 'The Battle', which is surprisingly well produced at an intellectual level. It even had an article explaining why Sputnik stayed up. On another page a cartoon demonstrated party feeling towards France: Picture I. Thin, Belsen figure, in casque colonial, sucks from straw the lifeblood of Africa—Picture II. Fatter version of this Frenchman leaves for home, a small Africa behind him.

But the magazine was directed not only against France. Jibes were made at the Minister of the Interior of the Senegal, and at the high wages paid to Ministers. Mahjemout Diop was later arrested on the orders of the Minister of the Interior.

OLD SENEGAL

Dakar—Gorée—St. Louis

369 [491] [361] [175] Our third afternoon in Dakar, Arnold and I took the afternoon ferry to Gorée, a tiny island embraced by the bay of Dakar. This island, which until the turn of the century was better known than Dakar itself, was discovered in 1444 by Dinis Dias, one of the early Portuguese explorers, and commands the entrance to the port of Dakar, so that for long it was prized as the most strategic of islands on the Guinea Coast. Today it is no more than an historical relic, but whether against a clear blue sky or of dark grey rain clouds massing for an assault on the mainland, it serves as a reminded that though in Africa the revolution has taken place largely over the last ten years, its groundwork has been prepared by centuries of contact with Europeans and their way of life.

The small ferry was crammed with trippers, armed with

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down the coast, there was little to worry about the future. And the creation of the Federal Government there marked its apogee. Five years later when the Federal Government was transferred to Dakar, St. Louis began its long decline which, when the Government is transferred, will be final.

As I walked along the old streets of St. Louis recalling vividly New Orleans, past old houses, their plaster façades beautiful with the patina of a century, and along the river that divides the island from the mainland with its brightly painted fishing boats, I could sympathize with the inhabitants of St. Louis. I could understand their pride; and their fears that their city might die. But at the same time the Government's desire to move into the economic centre of Senegal and the Administrative centre of the Federation, seemed to me a realistic one.

ECONOMICS OF THE REVOLUTION

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I returned to Dakar for an appointment with the High Commissioner of French West Africa whose office was on the ninth floor of the Administrative building. When I arrived I was shown into a small ante-room by a messenger dressed in khaki.

'The High Commissioner will see you soon,' he assured me.

Within two minutes a similarly dressed messenger beckoned me towards a large swing door. I pulled it open, only to be confronted by another, a foot in front of me. I pushed this open, and entered a large, well-windowed room. For a moment I could see no one. Then a tall, grey-haired man, looking very much like a university professor, came forward towards me, his right hand outstretched. M. Gaston Cusin, High Commissioner for French West Africa, led me to a large chair and, with a degree of informality that put me entirely at ease, he began to talk of the problems of French West Africa. To him, a former Director of Economic Affairs in France, it was clear that West Africa was largely an economic problem. He pointed to a large map of West Africa:

'We are hoping to develop iron reserves here in Mauretania; there in Guinea we want to open up bauxite reserves, in Dahomey

648 we plan to build a modern port; and there in the Soudan we hope to develop livestock for export. For that we would need a number of large refrigeration units here in Dakar.'

Thus he continued in detail all over the vast area of French West Africa stretching from St. Louis to the Chad, from the Sahara to the Guinea Coast, with an area of nearly 1,840,000 square miles, and a meagre population of 18 millions. I pointed to Nigeria and Ghana.

'I am afraid we British took the best bits of West Africa. Yet we haven't put nearly as much money into it by comparison. I wonder what Nigeria would be like if you French had got it?'

His eyes looked longingly at the large chunk of red.

471 'That would be something marvellous!' he said. Since the war the French have poured money into West Africa. Private funds have accounted for a lot, but FIDES, the equivalent of our Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, has contributed more than £175,000,000 to these territories, and together with other public funds the total of capital investment (not from private sources) is more than £300,000,000, for a large, but poor and underpopulated territory.

369 This heavy capital investment has created large cities like Dakar, Abidjan and Conakry. The Africans have come into contact not only with urban life, but with industry. In Dakar there has been a minor industrial revolution. In the past six years, largely because of this, the city's population has swollen to nearly 300,000. Africans have flooded into the city seeking work, [162] attracted by tales of its gay life or lured by its glamour and the prospect of easy money.

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463 I went down to the large brewery in Dakar, to see a modern industry with Africans as employees.

One of the managers there replied to my question, why weren't there any Africans in senior positions in the brewery. 'We have great difficulty in finding Africans to fill our managerial vacancies. You see, though many go to Paris they nearly all want to become lawyers, doctors, and officials. Very few are interested in becoming technicians. We would pay for their studies if we could find suitable candidates—you know, all part of the *Loi Cadre*. We must Africanize!'

'But haven't you found any good enough?'

/71 cont./

/133 The presence of a marl-calcareous horizon at a slight depth, the arrangement of the layers sloping toward the east, has favored the formation of a perpetual phreatic layer close to the surface and capable of supplying all the wells of the Thiès plateau.

The Thiès slope describes a concave line 40 kilometers long which begins in the north at the height of Mont-Rolland [361] and ends abruptly in the south at the height of the village of Tiao. The brow of the slope, with an average altitude of 100 meters, is cut broadly and deeply only by the "Ravin des Voleurs." At the foot of the slope there stretches a depressed, more or less swampy zone, /72/ /Fig. 1 appears here/ which borders it from north to south. Beyond Mont-Rolland, toward the northwest, accumulations of dune sand extend to the ocean (Fig. 1).

369 175 During the period of the pacification of Senegal by Faidherbe, Thiès was only a small village of unruly Sérère-None /Serer/, pillagers of caravans when the occasion presented itself. [361] This village was established near the actual site of the Faidherbe Redoubt, in a shaded and cool spot, hence the name "Diankhène" which was given to it and which means place of repose.

In 1856 Dakar was founded, and Saint-Louis developed. [648] A treaty concluded with the damel of Cayor (2) authorized the [206] installation of a telegraph line to connect these two cities. But the execution of the work came up against the ill-will of the damel and the continual insecurity that prevailed in the region of Thiès.

After the creation of the post of Mbidjem, near Lake Tanma, the /73/ post of Thiès was built in 1863. Its [361] [487] role was to pacify and to cover, in case of necessity, the troops that operated in the region. The latter, coming from Gorée and from Dakar, took the trail /piste/ from Rufisque to Pout and from there reached the post of Thiès and Cayor by way of the "Ravin des Voleurs," the only easy and direct passage that connected Cayor with the Cape Verde Peninsula.

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2. Damel. Wolof word meaning sovereign.

/9 cont./
244 shows no regard for it. Finally, the navetane eats millet
407 and does not produce any, which in certain regions aggravates
the problem of the supply. Before 1939, in the period of the full
development of groundnut cultivation, there were up to 70,000
navetanes in some years. The system of the authoritative organization of labor during the hostilities could by no means
support these effectives; therefore, with the return to freedom
in 1946, the number of navetanes had fallen to about 12,000.
In order to attract them, they were given free travel going
and returning. The suppression of these facilities in 1956 and
● [648] the closing of the Guinea frontier at the end /10/ of 1958 have
considerably diminished the importance of these temporary
[167] migrations, which, in sum, were not very profitable for the
[433] economy of Senegal.

Other seasonal movements of labor take place in the
244 framework of groundnut cultivation. The sourga come from
166 the city and take their place among their relatives under the
464 same conditions as the navetanes. The baraguini are laborers
[427] who, in the regions of Tambacounda and Kédougou, offer
their assistance to the cultivators during the harvest. They
dig up the groundnut stalks, dry them, and detach and clean
the seeds.

244 All of these types[1] of groundnut cultivation are charac-
433 terized by small yields: 830 kilograms per hectare on the
average in Senegal. These yields, a consequence of the
poorness of the traditional technical contrivances, can hardly
be improved. In recent decades the increase in volume of the
harvest has been linked with that of the area cultivated, which
is not without grave dangers: abuses of cultivation on soils
that are unstable, and a falling off of food production. After
some attempts without results in the years 1920-1930, it is
mechanized cultivation which, at the end of the Second
World War, seems most capable of increasing production for
the benefit of the mother country, which suffered from a grave
shortage of fatty substances.

[1] [See category 116, pp. 3-8 for types of autochthonous cultivation--Analyst]

/376 cont./

504 369 712 the support point for the whole military organization of the West African coast, was constructed between 1899 and 1902. Some of these accomplishments, such as the north jetty, the extension of the south jetty, and the dry dock, also concerned the commercial port, the construction of which began immediately afterwards and continued from 1903 to 1910. Two new piers were added to the first one, delimiting three docks between the south jetty and the military port, while the outfitting of the platforms was vigorously carried on (9).

369 ● 648 This phase of the construction of the port was accompanied by a very important act which was to serve as support for the development of Dakar: the transfer in 1902 of the office of the Government-general of West Africa from Saint-Louis to Dakar, which led to the establishment of high administrative offices in this city (Contrôle Financier, Treasury, Public Works, etc.) (10), although the Governor-general, awaiting the construction of his palace, was installed at Gorée, where he remained until 1907, an event adding considerably to the accomplishments on the port and which marked the beginning of the prodigious vigor of Dakar (Fig. 3).*

369 [505] As early as 1911 the port registered a tonnage of more than four million tons; it exceeded 5.6 millions in 1913. During the course of the First World War it played a role that greatly surpassed anything that the founders could have hoped for: in 1917, a tonnage of 10.5 million tons. To be sure, the end of the war led to a sharp decrease in the arrivals and departures, [504] but the recovery that followed the war was such that new works for the port soon became necessary. They were done between

*[See Category 116, P.19-- Analyst]

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[113] 9. Morazé, Ch., "Dakar", Annales de Géographie, 1936, pp. 607-671.

10. Morazé, Ch., op. cit., p. 620.

/380 cont. /
000 at Dakar.

369 Even more than in the sphere of aviation, however, it is
648 on the commercial and industrial plane that the other states of
[433] former French West Africa were, before the recent political
disturbances, dependent on Dakar. In fact Dakar was the seat
[453] of the banks and of the commercial associations or the branch
agencies of the mother country, all of whom /Pl. XXI and XXII
[441] appear here on unnumbered pages/ /381/exercise from Dakar,
if not always a role of direct administration, at least some co-ordination and in any case an influence that is not negligible on the branches scattered across Senegal, former French West Africa, and sometimes even across foreign territories. Thus, the C. F. A. O., the S. C. O. Z., the B. A. O., and the B. C. A., which practice their activities in practically all of Black Africa, although having their seat in Paris, are strongly established in Dakar, from where they manage a number of agencies and branches. On the other hand, the Société Maurel et Prom, which has branches in Senegal, Mauritania, the Sudan, Guinea, and Gambia, the "Commerce Africain," which has establishments in Senegal, Gambia, the Ivory Coast, and the Cameroun, and other companies have their
[439] seat in Dakar (17). Moreover it must be added that several industries (oil factories, soap factories, breweries, cement factories, textile factories, shoe factories, etc.) established on the peninsula of Cape Verde send a part of their products to other territories in former French West Africa.

369 Finally, because of its former function as federal capital,
633 Dakar brought together all of the federal political and adminis-
648 trative organs, which permitted it to direct and co-ordinate all
of the political, administrative, and economic life of former French West Africa.

Thus, Dakar became the leader, the undisputed metropolis, upon which there depended a regional assemblage much

[TEXT CONTINUES ON P. 17--ANALYST]

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17. "Le Commerce Africain" transferred its seat from Dakar to Paris in July 1960.

/381 cont./
369 larger than that of Paris. In Dakar, this function as a metrop-
●648 olis, which has been confirmed since the construction of the
633 commercial port, preceded and conditioned the development
of the city.

369 3. The city. The commercial affairs which thus make
166 African products and products from the outside converge toward
167 the Dakar crossroads could not fail to bring with them a great
[487] number of people. First, there are the Goréans, finally resigned
to their fate, who accompany or follow the commercial or administrative establishments being transferred to Dakar; then, non-Africans, administrators, technicians, merchants, etc., usually arriving from Europe by the same route as that of the imported manufactured products. But above all there are the masses who arrive by road and by rail, by these paths of a money economy which have greatly disturbed the villagers' traditional institutions and thus communicated to the people a mobility formerly unknown in the rural world. Willingly or unwillingly, the rural people of Senegal, of the Sudan, of Upper Guinea, and of the Upper Volta take to the road and rails to cast themselves into an /382/ /Fig. 3 appears here/ /383/ adventurous existence which will lead many of them to Dakar and to settle there. Finally, Africans from Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and Dahomey, students at the large educational institutions and officials who come in connection with the functions of the federal capital, also arrive by sea.

369 This human convergence, which since the last decade of
162 the century has continued to grow, has caused a vertiginous increase in the population. To be sure, for the period before 1955
[633] there were only estimations, all the less certain because the
boundaries of the commune have often changed, but the official figures (18), even though they should be corrected here or

[113] 18. Synthèse de la situation économique de l'ex-A.O.F. durant la période 1948 à

/1/

125 During the years 1960 and 1961, a demographic investigation by sampling was undertaken over the whole territory, the first one in the history of Senegal. (Administrative counts, city censuses, and an investigation in the central valley of the river /Senegal River/ had been made previously, but never a demographic inquiry covering the whole territory.)

[369] [162] The country has been divided into two large parts: the urban zone, composed of the whole region of Cape Verde and the cities of Thiès, Saint-Louis, Ziguinchor, Diourbel, and Louga; and the rural zone, which includes the rest of the territory. The sampling fraction was 1/50 in the rural zone and 1/20 in the urban zone. Subsequently a sampling to the twentieth was obtained by dividing into two a certain number of maps of the rural zone.

It will be seen merely from the method utilized that it renders illusory the study of small groups /groupes à effectif réduit/. It should be acknowledged from the first that the numbers below 500 (that is, 25 in the sample) are not significant.

II - The Structures:

III - The geographic distribution:

114 162 The operations in the field begun in the month of April 1960 were terminated in the month of August 1961 (April-June '60 for the rural zone, July '60 to August '61 /2/ for the urban zone). It should be acknowledged that on the whole the numbers indicated below correspond to the situation on the date of 1 July 1960. (Table 1 on following page)

This table shows, on the one hand, the low average density and, on the other hand, its great variability.

[563] 161 648 The non-African population is made up essentially of French and Lebano-Syrians. It is heavily concentrated in the urban zone and particularly in Cape Verde; 74% of the non-Africans of Senegal are actually in residence there. Moreover, this concentration has become accentuated in recent years for several reasons: the departure of the Senegalese and Mauritanian governments from Saint-Louis; the closing of a number of agencies in the interior following the Change in The commercial Circuits.

22:Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS 37

[p395]

CHAPTER VIII

SENEGAL AND THE DISTRICT OF DAKAR

1. GENERAL

Senegal. Area: 77,220 square miles. Population (1937): 1,666,374. 161
Density per square mile: 21·58. Capital: St. Louis. [131]
District of Dakar. Area: 66 square miles. Population (1937): [162]
126,929. Density per square mile: 1,923·16. Headquarters:
Dakar. [633]

ALTHOUGH it has fewer inhabitants than most of the other colonies [101]
and a lower density of population than Dahomey or the Ivory
Coast, Senegal is the most important of all the members of the
Federation. Much of the colony is semi-desert, but the remainder is
closely settled by some of the most vigorous and progressive peoples
of French West Africa. Most of the native citizens are Senegalese, 162
and the fame of the tirailleurs is known in every land. The colony
contains some of the earliest French settlements, and its honourable 648
position is attested by the fact that it alone in the Federation sends a
direct representative to the Chamber of Deputies at Paris.

The full title of the District of Dakar is the *Circonscription de* 633
Dakar et Dépendences. Beside the town of Dakar it includes Goree,
Rufisque, the territory round them, and a few small enclaves inside
Senegal. One of these enclaves is at Sebikotane, where is situated the
William Ponty School. The District has been a separate political
entity since 1924, and its Administrator is not responsible to the
Governor of Senegal.

The British colony of the Gambia has all its land frontiers with 131
Senegal.

The greatest distance from north to south in Senegal is 249 miles, and the greatest from west to east is 365 miles. The colony extends from 12° 19′ N. to 16° 42′ N. and from 17° 20′ W. to 11° 20′ W. The extreme west of the Cape Verde peninsula is 17° 32′ W.

Boundaries. The Atlantic Ocean forms the main western boundary. The only exceptions to this are the frontier with the Gambia and the boundary between Senegal and Dakar. The latter leaves the coast at 14° 49′ N. and runs roughly south-south-east until it is 2 miles from Goree bay. There it turns east and afterwards south to strike the bay 1 mile east of Rufisque.

22:Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS 37

7. HISTORY

SENEGAL is the oldest French colony in Africa. From it the Niger basin has been penetrated and the Sudan conquered. On it has been based the modern Federation. For more than two centuries, therefore, its history was that of French West Africa as a whole, and it is not until the close of the Napoleonic era that the domestic history of the colony becomes distinguishable. 175

The Early Nineteenth Century

The Peace of Paris restored the colonial *status quo* of 1 January 1792, but St. Louis was not returned to the French until 1817. The British occupation of Senegal had been purely military, with no attempt to introduce British civil administration. French officials had continued their duties, and, when they had died, had been succeeded by other Frenchmen. The resumption of French rule after the war, therefore, presented no difficulties. The country was fairly well known, and explorers used St. Louis more as a starting-point for distant journeys than to make new discoveries in Senegal itself. The British expedition of 1816 under Peddie and Campbell and the French one of 1818 under Mollien added considerably to European knowledge of Fouta, Ferlo, and Bondou, although their main objects were to penetrate Fouta Jalon. 175 648 ●

Attempts at European Colonization. In 1815 France agreed to the abolition of the slave trade, although the law embodying this decision was not passed for another three years. As the trade had previously been the key to the prosperity of Senegal, a new economy had to be devised. Experiments were consequently made with European settlers, who were to produce cotton and other tropical products. To execute these schemes, Louis XVIII appointed as first post-war Governor Colonel Schmaltz, who had lived for a number of years in the Dutch East Indies. Tragedy attended his voyage out. The ship carrying him, the *Méduse*, was wrecked in Arguin bay on 2 July 1816. The Governor and his wife were saved, but there were many deaths from drowning; and hunger, thirst, and exposure killed many who reached the shore. Out of one party of seventeen only three survived. Another party of 152 persons, including women and children, crowded on to one raft. Many were washed off by waves, many went mad, and many died of thirst. After thirteen days of horror, fifteen survivors were picked up, five of whom died before 175 167 [439] [567]

22:Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30
Trarza MS24

175 reaching St. Louis. This disaster has been made famous by the
167 celebrated painting of Théodore Géricault.

[648] As St. Louis was in British hands until the early months of 1817,
Schmaltz established his capital at Cape Verde.

The first settlers from France were sponsored by the Société Coloniale Philanthropique, and consisted of 175 men, 20 women, and 10 children. Their intention was to settle in the Cape Verde peninsula. This was against the advice of Schmaltz, who thought that part of the country unsuitable. The settlers landed at Goree in April 1817, shortly afterwards crossing to the mainland; but, owing to the attitude of the natives, they were unable to obtain land or labour. At the end of two months there were only six left on the peninsula: the remainder had been repatriated to France or had retired to St. Louis, Goree, or the Gambia. Schmaltz was able to prevent the philanthropic but misguided society from sending eighty more colonists to the same place.

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[175] Attempts to establish European colonists met with more success on
the Senegal. In 1819 Schmaltz had no difficulty in obtaining from the
[648] chiefs of Oualo all the land he wanted on the left bank of the river.
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In return, the chiefs were given annual subsidies (*coutumes*) amount-
[648] ing to some 10,000 francs. This arrangement was to lead to endless
[241] trouble. Cotton, coffee, indigo, and tobacco were to be the principal
crops, and colonists were not lacking.

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[175] The natives of Oualo were peaceable, but the Trarza and Brakna
Arabs, who claimed to be suzerains over Oualo, were hostile. At first
[648] they raided the colonists, but later they were defeated by troops from
St. Louis in a number of skirmishes. Eventually the French recog-
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nized nominal Arab suzerainty, and the colonists were allowed to
develop their holdings in relative quiet. Nevertheless, the Trarza
[648] Arabs continued to give trouble until 1835, when, after a series of
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defeats, they entered into a treaty by which they abandoned all
[712] claims to Oualo. The French armed post of Dagana was built for
the protection of the settlers, and an experimental station was started
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at Richard Toll for their instruction. The French Government
[654] supplied seeds and implements and paid a bonus on crops, and
[241] some forty European plantations were established. At first they
seemed to succeed, but the climate, the labour difficulties, and
the hostile attitude of the natives combined against them. In
1830 the home government withdrew its subsidy, and the plantations were soon abandoned. Since that date the French, while not discouraging European enterprise, have relied for agricultural
development principally on the native farmer.

22:Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS 37
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development principally on the native farmer. Trade, not agriculture, took the French farther up the river. In 1820 the post of Bakel was founded, and, under the auspices of Governor Roger, the Société de Galam established stations at Medine, at Mahina, and on the Falémé. The foundation of the company marked a partial return to the monopolistic policy of the previous century. Trade on the upper Senegal was reserved to the company from 1 January to 1 August each year. This caused much dissatisfaction, and the restriction disappeared with the winding-up of the company in 1840.

Like Brue, his predecessor of 120 years before, Roger explored Bambouk for its mineral wealth, but decided that the soundest method of developing Senegal was to expand its trade and agriculture.

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The Gum Trade. After the attempts at European colonization had failed, there developed in the gum trade a boom which reached its maximum in 1838. It will be remembered that, by the Peace of Paris, Great Britain had retained the exclusive right of carrying on this trade along the coast between Portendick and Arguin bay. Elsewhere the French reserved all this trade for their own nationals. Like other trades of the time, that in gum was carried on under a system of subsidies (*coutumes*) to native chiefs and fixed markets (*escales*). This system has been described above on p. 327, and was extremely lucrative to the Arabs. Moreover, the French Government in its treaties usually undertook to pay a subsidy to the chiefs, partly as ground rent for the posts it might establish in their territory, and partly in consideration of the goodwill and protection they were to afford to French trade.

Even so, the years between 1830 and 1860 saw material French extension and development. The following figures (the first two of which represent imports only) show the growth of trade of Senegal from the days of André Brue to those of Faidherbe.

Year	*Thousands of francs*
1700	700
1786	7,260
1821	2,100
1830	3,000
1837	7,000
1838	17,000
1839	13,600
1840	11,800
1845	23,000
1855	14,500
1863	33,100
1869	35,300

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Wolof MS 30
Trarza MS 24

S 175 439 [648] From 1836 onwards treaties were made with the chiefs of the Casamance basin, and posts were constructed at Sedhiou, Karaban, and Diembering. These treaties respected Portuguese historic but obsolete rights at Ziguinchor, but effectively guaranteed that the future of the river should be French.

S [567] [427] [464] The abolition of the status of slavery by France in 1848 deprived the French merchants of a cheap supply of labour, which they had rented from the chiefs, and in 1850 a committee was appointed to consider withdrawal from the colony or, as an alternative, the establishment of French authority. It decided in favour of the latter, and the policy of trade treaties came to an end.

The new French policy, to which Napoleon III was pledged, was summed up as 'absolute freedom of commerce with the suppression of the escales; establishment of security, by force if necessary; the substitution of full and entire authority for the system of treaties and subsidies; methodical organization of expansion towards the interior; and concurrently the development of economic institutions'.

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'By Force if Necessary'

175 [643] *Faidherbe.* It was to carry out this policy that Faidherbe was appointed Governor of Senegal in December 1854. He had already had much experience as a soldier and administrator in the colony, and, with a break of eighteen months, he held office till July 1865. His period of office marked a turning-point in the history of Senegal, and he is justly remembered as one of the builders of the modern French Colonial Empire. At first his resources were
S [701] pitifully small. He had four companies of marine infantry, a company of native infantry formed on the liberation of the slaves in 1848, sixty spahis, and some detachments of artillery and engineers. His naval strength was on a similar scale. Both were substantially strengthened in the next few years.

T S W 175 648 *The Arabs.* Faidherbe decided to deal with the Trarza Arabs. Notwithstanding the treaty of 1835, they had continued their marauding expeditions across the river, and had re-established a supreme influence over the Ouolofs of Oualo. Early in 1855 the Trarza chief Mohammed el Abib insolently demanded the French evacuation of certain islands near the mouth of the Senegal. Faidherbe marched against him and defeated him near St. Louis on 15 February. On 25 February the Ouolofs were defeated near Ross. The French captured more than 2,000 cattle and burned 20 villages.

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Wolof MS 30
Trarza MS 24

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After another victory in March at Diagane near Merinaghen, 175
Faidherbe annexed Oualo. He divided it into provinces under chiefs 648
nominated by himself, and set up Fara Penda, who remained faithful, W
as king. In two years many villages destroyed by the Arabs were rebuilt [175]
and the population of Oualo rose from 17,000 to 34,000. Faidherbe, [648]
who was loath to use force before persuasion had failed, then offered [627]
Mohammed el Abib peace if he would renounce the subsidies. The [631]
Arab replied by demanding an increase in payments, the destruction [635]
of French forts, the prohibition of armed vessels on the Senegal, and the recall of Faidherbe to France. During the absence of Faidherbe in Oualo, Mohammed el Abib advanced in April 1855 to the gates of St. Louis, from which he was beaten back. This marked the limit of Arab successes. In the following January an engagement near Lake Cayar resulted in the capture of 600 tribesmen, and other skirmishes had similar results. Despairing of bringing the main Arab armies to a pitched battle, Faidherbe determined to subdue them by famine, and set himself to destroy or capture their cattle and supplies. By May 1856 these tactics reduced the Arabs to dire straits, and several tribes submitted. The chief's son Ely fled to Diambour. Faidherbe pursued him, and annexed the province which is now Louga. Mohammed el Abib held on, however, and in 1857 invaded Oualo. He was heavily defeated. At last he sued for peace, and on 20 May 1858 signed a treaty (p. 328). A parallel treaty was concluded with the Brakna Arabs at Podor on 10 June.

Although the commercial provisions of these treaties were revised later, they brought to an end, once and for all, the Arab menace to the peace and development of Senegal.

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In 1859 a similar organization to that of Oualo was set up for 175
Dimar, thus extending the colony as far up the river as Podor.

Further Penetrations. Faidherbe's dealings with the Arabs and the Ouolofs have been described in some detail, as they illustrate his abilities as a general, a diplomatist, and an administrator. By the same combination of force and diplomacy he, or his successor Pinet-Laprade, brought Fouta, Toro, the whole Ferlo country, Cayor, Sine, Saloum, and the Casamance under effective French
control. He thus completed the outline of the modern colony. In S
1859 the fanatically Moslem Toucouleur of Fouta, under their [648]
Almami, Mahamadu Birane, submitted to a division into three
independent states under French protection: Dagana, Fouta, and S
Toro. In 1862, while Faidherbe was in France, the Almami revolted [669]
and tried to re-establish his paramountcy. This revolt was quelled

MS37
Wolof MS30

175 after severe fighting, and in 1863 Fouta and Toro were definitely
S annexed by the French.

W *Cayor.* The state of Cayor extended from Cape Verde northward
175 along the coast nearly to St. Louis, and at the end of the eighteenth
[illegible] century it had obtained independence of the Ouolofs. Goree had
W been taken by the French from the Dutch in 1677, and by treaties of
[635] 1764 and 1765 the Damel of Cayor had ceded the tip of the Cape
Verde peninsula in full sovereignty to France. He had further agreed
to restrain his subjects from pillaging the cargoes of wrecks and from
imprisoning their crews. In return he was to receive an annual
subsidy of 180 bars, one-third in iron and the remainder in merchandise.

These treaties, however, had never been implemented. In 1825
Governor Roger considered them dead, and advised Frenchmen who
wished to acquire land in the peninsula to make their own arrangements
with the native authorities. At the same time, Roger made a
fresh convention regarding wrecks, which was no more observed
S than the earlier treaties. In 1832 land was purchased for a cemetery
W on the mainland and in 1846 a mission of the Society of the Sacred
[797] Heart, which received a government subsidy until 1906, was established
S at Dakar.

[162] The population of Goree, some 5,000 persons, needed wood, water,
building materials, and fresh provisions, which they could only purchase
W at extortionate prices on the mainland. All efforts to conclude
[439] agreements with the chiefs on these matters failed, and wreckers'
profits were not to be diminished by scraps of paper. Security was
needed for the projected railway from St. Louis and it was desirable
S to give the priests protection. In 1857, therefore, the French
[712] Government authorized the construction of a fort on the mainland.
Birahima, the reigning Damel of Cayor, at first acquiesced in this
occupation, largely because his authority over the Lebous who
inhabited the peninsula had long been but nominal. The post was
S used by Faidherbe for a base for his operations in 1859. In that year,
[712] after the battle of Fatik (18 May), the tribesmen of Sine, Saloum, and
Baol submitted to French authority, and posts were created at Joal
and Kaolack. Trouble arose under the Damel's successor, Makodou,
who refused to recognize Birahima's agreement to allow a French
road and telegraph line from St. Louis to Goree to be run through
Cayor. A French column from St. Louis under Faidherbe met an
expedition under Pinet-Laprade from Goree and occupied Makodou's
capital, Mekhé, on 12 January 1861. On 1 February he accepted

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Wolof MS 30

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French protection. Hardly was Faidherbe's back turned when Makodou repudiated his engagements. A fresh expedition was necessary, and on 12 March Makodou's forces were repulsed again at Diati near Mekhé. Faidherbe thereupon encouraged an internal revolt, which resulted in the flight of Makodou and the recognition of Madiodio as Damel. He in his turn was dethroned by Lat Dior, whom the French also recognized. He also failed to observe his predecessor's treaties, and in 1863 Faidherbe marched against him and re-established Madiodio. In the December of that year Lat Dior gathered his forces and fell upon the French garrison of Goumbo Gueoul, when Captain Lorans and almost all his detachment of 140 tirailleurs were killed. This time there were no half measures: Lat Dior's army was cut to pieces by Pinet-Laprade near Pout on 12 January 1864, but he himself escaped to the Gambia. Faidherbe then suppressed the native kingdom, established a French protectorate, and divided Cayor into cantons, each under a chief of his own appointment.

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In 1865 Pinet-Laprade, who had succeeded Faidherbe, had to deal with a mallam named Maba, who threatened to involve in a holy war not only Cayor but also the country as far east as Fouta. In 1869 Lat Dior again invaded Cayor, and in 1871 was again recognized by the French as Damel, though shorn of part of his territory. This arrangement worked well for ten years, and when Ahmadu Checkhou, a mallam of Toro, invaded Cayor, the French could not refuse armed aid to Lat Dior. The former was defeated and killed by French forces at Boumdou near Coki in February 1875. In 1881 Lat Dior once more gave trouble by opposing the construction of a railway, and, after military operations, he was replaced by his nephew. Internal unrest followed for some years and Lat Dior tried to take advantage of it; but on 26 October 1886 he was defeated and killed. The protectorate was finally abolished, and Cayor was annexed to the colony.

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At the close of Faidherbe's term of office in 1865 modern Senegal may be said to have emerged. It would be a mistake to regard him only as a conqueror, for, though his primary object was to impose French authority, Senegal owes to him the foundation of its civil administration, its education, its banking system, and its Survey Department. Sympathetic to the natives, he tried to preserve their institutions to the utmost extent compatible with his primary object. While not prepared to discourage European colonization under suitable conditions, Faidherbe considered that the main agricultural

22:Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS 37
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development must be by native farmers guided by French instructors and aided by French capital. In 1861 French colonial trade, which had hitherto been restricted to French merchants and the French flag, was thrown open to all nations, though French goods continued to have a preference. This reform was not well received by the conservative merchants of St. Louis, but there can be no doubt that it rapidly proved of benefit to the colony.

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Mahmadu Lamine. The last challenge to French rule within the boundaries of Senegal arose from a Soninké mallam named Mahmadu Lamine. Having returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca, he set up as a holy man at Medine and proceeded to interfere in the domestic concerns of the natives of Bondou. Rebuffed by their rightful ruler, he installed himself at Sénoudébou early in 1886, proclaimed himself a mahdi, and claimed a holy mission to restore the ancient power of the Sarakollé dynasty (Vol. I, p. 168). In March and April he attacked the fort of Bakel, at the head of 12,000 fanatics, but was repulsed. In May Colonel Frey marched out from St. Louis with a strong column which relieved Bakel. Notwithstanding this, Mahmadu again invaded Bondou, where he defeated and killed the king. Then he attacked the French post at Sénoudébou, crossed the Senegal, and endeavoured to cut the French communications between Bakel and Kayes. Galliéni himself, who had been recently appointed to command the troops in Upper Senegal, took the field against him and broke his power in several engagements. The mallam fortified himself at a village 46 miles south-west of Tambacounda. This village was taken by the French on 8 December 1887. Mahmadu escaped; but he was attacked by allies of the French on 9 December, and two days later died of his wounds. All the tribes of the country north of the Gambia boundary then sought French protection. Later disturbances in Senegal had their origin either in internal tribal dissensions or in dislike of closer control by France. In all respects they were minor affairs.

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The Consolidation of French Rule. The original treaties, of which the French negotiated some 130 between 1785 and 1891 with the chiefs of Senegal, dealt with trade only. They fixed the rents and rates payable by each individual trader, and usually gave subsidies to the chiefs in return for their goodwill. These treaties did not attempt to deal with the internal administration of the tribes or with their foreign relations. The next stage was a treaty of friendship and protection, in which the native state was free to conduct its own affairs, subject only to the general guidance of French Residents.

At this stage no French taxation was imposed. Faidherbe was the first 175
to insist that the election of any chiefs must be subject to his approval, 648
and from this time onwards the French hold gradually grew tighter. As the French historian Sabatié has put it:

> 'These treaties guaranteed the political organization, the religion, customs, institutions, and laws of the native country concerned. They were designed to ensure the security of our commerce and respect for the property of our nationals and our subjects, and they stipulated, by way of compensation, the collection of certain taxes on cattle and exported products for the benefit of chiefs. As a result of the evolution of the colony and its economic and administrative necessities, the clauses and obligations of these treaties have lapsed.'

The system lasted until towards the end of the nineteenth century; but from that time onwards native powers, especially over judicial matters, land, and tribute, have been gradually curtailed. Native chiefs have become agents appointed by the Government, and native administrative institutions have almost everywhere been deliberately abolished. This policy has its roots not only in administrative convenience but also in a strong sense of duty to the individual native and a desire to protect him from misrule.

The Modern Constitution

Until 1920 the four communes of Dakar, Goree, Rufisque, and 631
St. Louis were described as the territory under direct administration, 633
the remainder of the colony as a protectorate. In that year the distinction, which had long been one without a difference, was formally abolished.

Senegal, being the oldest colony, contains about a quarter of the 641
whole European population of French West Africa. It also contains
a larger proportion of educated and politically minded natives than [162]
the other colonies, and its constitution is more democratic. This last fact is mainly due to the equalitarian doctrines of the July Monarchy at the time when the personal status of Senegalese native citizens and their rights as Frenchmen were determined. In 1833 the French Parliament enacted that any person born free, or having legally
acquired his liberty, enjoyed in the French colonies both civil and [648]
political rights under conditions prescribed by law. In 1848, therefore, when the colony first acquired the right to send a deputy to the French Parliament, natives born in the French settlements of
Goree, Rufisque, and St. Louis, the only French soil in Senegal at [633]
the time, became entitled to the Parliamentary vote and to all the

22:Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS 37

641 [633] other privileges of French citizenship. In due course the same status was conferred on natives of Dakar, and in 1916 French citizenship was extended not only to natives born in these four communes but to their descendants also. It thus came about that out [162] of 80,500 native citizens in the whole of French West Africa 78,000 live in Senegal or Dakar. Of these the great bulk resides in the four old communes.

633 Municipal government, on entirely metropolitan lines, was conferred upon St. Louis and Goree in 1872 and upon Rufisque in 1880. In 1887 Dakar, which had hitherto formed part of Goree, was separated from it, receiving its own elected mayor and council, and in 1929 absorbed its parent. The District of Dakar was separated from Senegal in 1924, and received its own Administrator, directly responsible to the Governor-General.

646 Parliamentary representation was suspended under Napoleon III, but restored in 1870. Until 1914 a European had been elected, but the racial issue was deliberately raised in that year, when M. Blaise [645] Diagne, a Sérère, entered on his long term as Deputy for Senegal. He thoroughly justified his race by heading a campaign for voluntary recruitment in Senegal during the War of 1914–1918, and subsequently held office as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. As early as 1879 the General Council was elected by the citizens of [633] the four communes. It had certain powers of taxation and legislation over the four communes, powers which, though limited, were more democratic than in other parts of French West Africa. Its greatest influence, however, lay in the criticism of the Government, a function which, withheld from it by law, sprang naturally from the power of taxation. When the formal distinction between colony and protectorate disappeared, the General Council gave place to the existing Colonial Council (p. 432), a body with generally similar powers extending over the whole colony.

648 [643] *Senegal and Federation.* Before 1845 and again from 1859 to 1893 the whole of what is now French West Africa was administered by the Governor of Senegal. It was natural, therefore, that in 1895 he should be appointed Governor-General of the Federation, with its not very precise constitution. This appointment was welcomed in Senegal, as it enhanced the colony's supremacy. In 1902 the Governor-Generalship was made a separate office, and Senegal sank to the level of the other colonies. This new arrangement, although a blow [652] to the pride of the Senegalese, did not touch their pockets. They still kept control of their own revenues, out of which they voted a sum

to the Federal Government. In 1904, however, when the distinct 648
Federal budget was instituted, custom duties were lost to the various 652
colonies. The General Council of Senegal protested vigorously. [651]
Its spokesmen said that the Federal Government had taken away
78 per cent. of the colony's revenue and only assumed 39 per cent.
of its expenditure. So strongly did the Council feel on the question
that it impugned the validity of the federal financial arrangements
before the Council of State at Paris. This latter body, as was to be
expected, confirmed them in 1908, but the Senegalese have never
fully accepted the new system. In 1929, for example, it was stated
that Senegal was contributing half the customs revenue of French [651]
West Africa, though containing only one-tenth of its population.
Moreover, despite its democratic Colonial Council, the colony has
no more direct influence in federal affairs than Mauritania. Even
to-day protests are still heard periodically against the financial system
of the Federation and its alleged encroachments on the sphere of the
Colonial Government.

Christianity

The first definite record of a Christian mission is that of the 797
French Capuchins, who sailed from Dieppe in 1635. They divided into two parties: one, under Pères Alexis and Bernardin, landed at Rufisque, where they were entertained by Portuguese Christians. During their stay they baptized 27 natives. The other party landed at St. Louis, where there was not yet a permanent French settlement, and met with misfortune. Some of them died, and the survivors joined their brothers at Rufisque. The Protestant Dutch made life impossible for them, and the whole party returned to France. Though from time to time priests of the Society of the Holy Spirit (founded in 1726 to train missionaries for the French colonies) visited Senegal, no serious missionary effort seems to have been made till after the Peace of Paris, when the first Prefect Apostolic was appointed to St. Louis.

The first nuns to work in Senegal were of the community of
St. Joseph of Cluny. These were sent out in 1819 to St. Louis at the
request of the Governor to undertake nursing and education. The
community established two schools in St. Louis and one in Goree in [871]
1826.

In 1846 the first mission was founded at Dakar, which the same year became the seat of the Vicar Apostolic of the Two Guineas. These missionaries belonged to the Society of the Sacred Heart

9. ADMINISTRATION

DAKAR, the capital of the Federation and the residence of the Governor-General, is geographically in Senegal, and from its 633
foundation in 1863 it was administered by the Governor of Senegal as part of that colony. By the decrees of 25 October and 27 November 1924, however, the District of Dakar was, without prejudice to its municipal institutions, made a separate administrative unit, under an Administrator directly responsible to the Governor-General. Only [648]
Dakar and Goree were originally included, with an area of 60 square miles, but the Commune of Rufisque was added by a decree of 9 June 1937. The District now has a population of 127,000, and it has its own budget. [162]

Senegal returns a deputy to the French Chamber of Deputies, 648
who is elected by French citizens (European or native) resident in the colony and in Dakar. The deputy is *ex officio* Senegal's representative on the Supreme Council of the French Colonial Empire.

Councils

Executive Councils. The Executive Council of Senegal is composed 645
of the Governor, the Secretary-General, the Attorney-General, the officer commanding the troops, one French citizen elected by the Chamber of Commerce of St. Louis, and one citizen and two subjects nominated for two years by the Governor-General. [648]

It is a purely advisory body, but the Governor is bound to consult it on such matters as the Colonial Budget, proposed changes in taxation, disposal of government property, and concessions. He may indeed, require its advice on any matter he chooses.

The Executive Council for the District of Dakar was at one time 633
composed of the Standing Committee of the Governor-General's Council together with the Administrator. This arrangement, [648]
legalized in 1924, was changed by a decree of the 9 June 1937 which gave Dakar its own Executive Council, composed of the Administrator, Deputy-Administrator, the officer commanding the troops at Dakar, the Attorney-General, one member of the Chamber of Commerce appointed by that body, two municipal councillors of Dakar and one of Rufisque appointed by their respective councils, and one French subject appointed by the Governor-General. [648]

633 645 [648] The Council has the same functions as that of the colony, but its decisions need the approval (usually formal) of the Standing Committee of the Governor-General's Council.

The Executive Councils of Senegal and of Dakar are known as *conseils privés*, whereas those of the other colonies are known as *conseils d'administration.*

646 633 *The Colonial Council of Senegal.* The history of the Colonial Council and of its predecessor, the General Council, has been given above. The earlier council had jurisdiction over the four full communes only, but its successor, which dates from 1920, when all distinctions between colony and protectorate were abolished, has jurisdiction over the whole colony. The inhabitants of the District of Dakar still retain their votes for the Colonial Council, and as a corollary the Council can discuss the affairs of the District. The pretext for this decision was afforded by the provision, in the decrees [652] of 1924, that the Colonial Budget of Senegal should contain a grant in aid of Dakar; but French writers do not disguise the fact that it was thought not desirable entirely to divorce the District from the rest of Senegal. The decrees of 1924, therefore, expressly left it an integral, though autonomous, part.

646 666 [642] The Colonial Council is unique in French Africa in that its membership includes Europeans, natives, chiefs, citizens, and subjects. It is, therefore, worthy of detailed mention. Its constitution and powers are laid down in a decree of 4 December 1920, as amended by decrees of 30 March 1925, 13 January 1930, and 8 April 1939. This last added the subjects. The colony is divided into four electoral districts, from which members are elected on a population basis. The Council is elected for a term of six years, but, on the recom- [648] mendation of the Governor, it may be dissolved by the Governor-General. Should a dissolution occur, a new election must be held within three months. There are 62 members in all: 26 citizens elected by citizens, 18 provincial or canton chiefs elected by those of the same rank, and 18 native subjects. These subjects must either have been born in the colony or be descendants of subjects born in [641] the colony; they must have completed their military service; and they are elected by all other subjects who fulfil the same conditions. In 1929 the European element only numbered one-fifth of the total membership, and the additions made in 1939 will have had the effect of swamping it.

646 643 The Council meets for a fortnight's session once a year, but it can be summoned by the Governor at any time. It chooses its own

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22: Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS37

president, but the Governor has the right of addressing it and of 646
deputing high officials to speak to it of the work of their own departments. [643]
It appoints a Standing Committee, which can meet to transact business when the full Council is not in session. It is bound, 646
however, to report to its parent body.


Dagana
Podor
BAS SÉNÉGAL
ST. LOUIS
PODOR
LOUGA
Louga
Linguère
Matam
DJOLOFF
MATAM
Tivaouane
Thiès
Rufisque
THIÈS
Diourbel
BAOL
Bakel
M'Bour
Fatik
SINE-SALOUM
TAMBACOUNDA
Foundiougne
Kaolack
Kaffrine
BAKEL
Tambacounda
SÉDHIOU
KOLDA
Kolda
HAUTE GAMBIE
Dioulouloù
Bignona
BIGNONA
Sedhiou
Kédougou
Oussouye
Ziguinchor
ZIGUINCHOR
International Boundary ....
Intercolonial " ....
Provincial " ....
Colonial Capital .... ● ST. LOUIS
Provincial Headquarters .... ● Diourbel
District " .... ○ Kaffrine
Miles 50 0 50 100 150 200 Miles

FIG. 52. *Senegal: Administrative Divisions*

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634

The Council's powers are wide. It must be consulted on a proposal
to create new communes, and it may advise on any matter put before [643]
it by the Governor. It may legislate on eight stated topics, which are
chiefly concerned with the management of state property and with [652]
the colony's financial contributions to the public works of the
Federation. This legislation comes into force within two months, [648]
unless previously vetoed by the Governor-General. The Council
also has the right to deliberate the assessment and collection of [652]

646 taxes and all items of the Colonial Budget not fixed by the Governor-
[648] General.

[652] Article 40 of the decree of 1920 forbade any deliberation of political
[642] matters and any resolution concerning them. The power to discuss the budget, however, has nullified this prohibition, and criticism of the Government plays a considerable part in the Council's debates.
[631] The citizens are usually more independent than the chiefs, since the latter owe their appointments to the Governor. It is too early to judge the effect of the recent addition of subjects.

It will be clear from the foregoing that this Colonial Council
[642] performs a very useful function. Although it cannot bring the machinery of government to a standstill, it can seriously hamper the administration. In consequence Senegal has a greater tincture of democracy than any other colony.

Territorial Divisions

635 The colony is divided into fifteen provinces (Fig. 52), some of
634 them subdivided into districts. Their names and the names of their headquarters towns are as follows.

Province	*Headquarters*	*Area in square miles*	*District headquarters*
Bakel	Bakel	8,755	..
Baol	Diourbel	1,714	..
Bas Sénégal	St. Louis	2,351	Dagana
Bignona	Bignona	1,699	Diouloulou
Djoloff	Linguéré	6,275	..
Haute Gambie	Kédougou	5,212	..
Kolda	Kolda	5,599	..
Louga	Louga	3,886	..
Matam	Matam	10,116	..
Podor	Podor	4,857	..
Sedhiou	Sedhiou	2,703	..
Sine-Saloum	Kaolack	10,228	Fatik, Foundiougne, Kaffrine
Tambacounda	Tambacounda	9,998	..
Thiès	Thiès	2,707	M'Bour, Tivaouine
Ziguinchor	Ziguinchor	1,120	Oussouye

635 The four provinces of Bignona, Kolda, Sedhiou, and Ziguinchor are grouped together as the Casamance Territory, at the head of which is a Session Administrator, or Chief Commissioner, residing at Ziguinchor.

In almost all provinces the provincial Commissioner is assisted by a Council of Notables (Plate 113).

22:Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS 37

took with him a lay schoolmaster, who opened a school for boys at 871
St. Louis in 1817. Its pupils varied in number from 60 to 100, and 797
it continued under state and lay control until 1841. In that year its management was handed over to Roman Catholic priests, while the Government undertook to maintain the school and to pay for its equipment and the salaries of its teachers.

Girls' education dates from 1826, when the Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny founded schools at St. Louis and Goree.

By 1854 there were four schools in Senegal. They all belonged to Roman Catholic missions supported by government grants, and they counted only 590 pupils on their rolls. There were difficulties regarding the admission of Moslems to these schools and, as Islam was the prevailing faith, the spread of education was hindered. In 1857
Faidherbe opened a Moslem School at St. Louis, and until 1903 this 872
remained the only lay primary school in Senegal. By 1898 there were 9 primary schools in the four communes and about 30 in the protectorate. These were staffed by interpreters and non-commissioned officers, and their existence was spasmodic. At that time elementary
education throughout French West Africa was mainly in the hands of [797]
the missions, and, so far as the Government took any interest in it at all, it was organized by local regulations in each colony. The
Governor-General's order of 24 November 1903 set up a uniform [648]
system of state-controlled education throughout the Federation.

In 1938 Senegal and Dakar had 132 European teachers and 337 875
native in Government schools and 48 teachers in recognized private schools. Pupils were arranged as follows:

	Schools	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Total pupils* 871
GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS				
Primary				
Village schools	72	5,946	241	6,187
Regional schools	16	4,590	432	5,022
Urban schools	10	3,392	752	4,144
Higher Primary	2	158	14	172
Technical	4	146	0	146
	104	14,232	1,439	15,671
PRIVATE SCHOOLS				
Primary	13	1,164	293	1,457
Totals	117	15,396	1,732	17,128

There were also 2,295 Moslem schools giving rudimentary instruction to 16,190 pupils.

874 In 1927 apprentice courses in woodwork and metalwork were started in St. Louis and Kaolack by the Public Works Department for selected schoolboys between the ages of 13 and 16 years.

871 There is a number of educational institutions in Dakar of a higher grade than primary. These are the responsibility of the Federal Government and have been described in Volume I.

Health

743 Senegal is divided into thirteen medical districts, each of which is intended to be under the supervision of a European medical officer. There are 17 medical stations, each under a native auxiliary. There are also 16 maternity centres and 117 posts visited once a week by a medical officer.

In 1937 Senegal and Dakar had 3 major hospitals and 34 minor hospitals and dispensaries. These provided 394 beds for European patients and 1,805 for native. There were 80 European medical officers, 31 native auxiliaries, 30 midwives, 124 male nurses, and 21 female nurses.

[744] In addition there were four travelling parties (*groupes sanitaires mobiles*). One of these specialized in fighting sleeping-sickness in the Casamance Territory, and the other three were concerned with more general sanitary and prophylactic measures.

The Pasteur Institute at Dakar, a federal concern, is justly famous. [797] Some medical work is done by missionaries. Unofficial committees of the Croix-Rouge are concerned with infant welfare at Dakar, Diourbel, St. Louis, and Tivaouane.

[652] In 1937 Senegal voted 12,000,000 francs for medical services and Dakar 11,000,000 francs.

10. PORTS

36 ST. LOUIS (16° 01′; 16° 30′ W.). Population, 30,586, including
[131] 1,231 Europeans. Colonial capital of Senegal and of Mauritania.
[162] Full Commune. Headquarters of the province of Bas Sénégal.
[489] Custom-house. Law courts. Chamber of Commerce. Hospital
[743] and dispensary. Army headquarters and barracks. Police head-
[712] quarters. Belgian Consulate. Meteorological station. Landing-
[648] ground. Wireless station. Lycée Faidherbe. École des Fils des
[654] Chefs et des Interprêtes. Higher Primary and Technical Schools.
Protestant and Roman Catholic missions. Bank of West Africa.
[697] Power station. Prison. Hotels. Garages. Race-course. Botanical
gardens. Experimental plantation. Daily market.

22:Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS 37
ST. LOUIS

361 The oldest part of St. Louis (Fig. 53) stands on an island in the estuary of the Senegal. This island is some 2,400 yards long and averages 350 yards in width, and its southern extremity is 13¾ miles from the mouth of the river. It has three main suburbs, N'Dar Toute and Guet N'Dar on the Langue de Barbarie, and Sor on the mainland.

History

361 Early navigators in search of the gold of Bambouk used the Senegal
175 as a means of entry to the interior, and in 1658 a settlement was
[487] founded. This was the first French post in West Africa, and it was
named after the patron saint of King Louis XIV. Its story has largely
[103] been told elsewhere, since, from the first, it played a prominent part
in the general history of French West Africa as a whole and of
Senegal in particular. The main events in the past were its capture by
[648] the British in 1759, its recapture in 1779, its second capture in 1809,
and its final restoration to the French in 1817. During the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries it steadily grew in size and wealth, but in
recent years it has been forced, both commercially and politically, to
yield to Dakar.

The Town

361 The original island is now almost completely covered with buildings. These include Government House (Senegal), the Law Courts, the principal barracks, the power station, and the Roman Catholic church in the centre; the prison, two mosques, and another barracks to the north; and the hospital and another mosque to the south. N'Dar Toute has Government House (Mauritania) (Plate 92),
[164] the market, and yet another barracks, and Sor has the railway stations and the cemeteries. Guet N'Dar is inhabited almost entirely by natives.

491 The western arm of the river is crossed by two bridges. The
361 Geôle Bridge, 150 yards long, connects the main town to N'Dar Toute, and it takes its name from the prison near its eastern end. Five hundred and sixty yards south of it is the Servotuis Bridge, the western end of which marks the dividing line between N'Dar Toute and Guet N'Dar. At the other end of it is an open space at present called Place Pétain. In a line with the Servotuis Bridge is the Faidherbe Bridge across the main stream. Built in 1900, this bridge is 570 yards long and has six fixed spans and a roadway 37 feet wide. Near its western end is a swing bridge with two openings each of 30 yards.

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[ST. LOUIS]

206 *Wireless.* The wireless station is to the south of Guet N'Dar.

505 [648] *River.* Above Faidherbe Bridge the river is closed to all vessels not flying the French flag. Boats drawing 10 feet can ascend to Podor all the year round, and in the rainy season they can reach Kayes (Vol. I, p. 367). Table V shows how greatly river traffic on the Senegal has declined in recent years.

TABLE V. *Tonnage of Goods from Kayes*

[497] [494]

	1928	*1929*	*1930*	*1934*	*1935*
Sent by rail or road	9,545	9,555	11,456	5,269	6,224
Sent by river	2,520	5,815	3,425	313	260

Shipping. There are no sea-going ships calling regularly, but the Messageries Africaines and the Messageries du Sénégal run services up-river.

36 [131] [162] [489] [712] [648] [654] [508] [697] [498] [654] **DAKAR** (14° 39'; 17° 25' W.). Population, 80,052, including *c.* 6,000 Europeans. Capital of the Federation and Headquarters of the District of Dakar. Full Commune. Custom-house. Law courts. Chamber of Commerce. Pasteur Institute. Hospitals. Naval base and dockyard. General Headquarters of the army in French West Africa. Police headquarters. British Consulate-General. Belgian, Brazilian, Czechoslovakian, Danish, Eireann, Greek, Italian, Netherlands, Norwegian, Swedish, and Swiss Consulates. Argentine, Finnish, Spanish, and Uruguayan Vice-Consulates. Meteorological station. Airport and seaplane base. Wireless stations. Colleges and schools. Protestant churches. Roman Catholic Vicariate Apostolic of Guinea and Vicariate General. Bank of West Africa. Banque Commerciale Africaine. Crédit Foncier de l'Ouest Africain. Banque Belge de l'Afrique. Power station. Prison. Public library. Hotels. Garages. Railway workshops. Cinemas. Race-course. Sports stadium. Botanical gardens. Agricultural experimental station. Daily market.

361 [433] Dakar (Fig. 54) is approximately 2,600 miles distant from Southampton, from Cape Town, and from Rio de Janeiro. It is, therefore, well placed for taking a share in the trade of the South Atlantic, and it is small wonder that it has become the third port in the French Empire, being surpassed only by Marseilles and Le Havre. It is, moreover, of the first importance strategically.

244 sixth crop of Africa, and 43 per cent. of the total continental produc-
[833] tion comes from Senegal. The two main groups cultivated are the
'runner' and the 'erect'. The Rufisque and Cayor varieties, both
runners, are those grown generally here and also in British West
Africa. The method of cultivation is described in Volume I, p. 321.
Ground-nuts were originally grown as a staple native crop, but the
[939] industrial demand for vegetable oils, coupled with the development
of transport facilities, opened up a world market for them. Extra
[167] labour for the harvest is provided annually by seasonal immigration
from French Sudan, French Guinea, Portuguese Guinea, and the
[464] Gambia. In 1938 the number of outside workers was 69,757. Of
these, 56,743 went to the Kaolack area, between 1,000 and 3,500 to
Sedhiou, Ziguinchor, Kolda, Tambacounda, and Diourbel, and the
remainder to Thiès and Linguéré.

[258] There are numerous shelling factories. Early in 1939 new ones
were opened at Kaolack, Ziguinchor, and Koungheul.

In 1938 nearly 2,000,000 acres were under cultivation and the
[654] experimental station at Bambey distributed 5,414 tons of selected
seed. In 1939 7,382 tons of seed were sent out, with a corresponding
increase in acreage.

[648] During the British blockade of French West Africa after the fall of
[388] France in 1940, ground-nuts were converted into fuel oil. If this
practice has been proved worth continuing after the war, cultivation
may be greatly extended.

248 *Sisal.* Sisal originated in Mexico, being named after the port of
Sisal in Yucatan province, and it was introduced into Senegal at the
end of the nineteenth century. The species grown are *Agave rigida
sisalana*, *A. rigida elongata*, and *A. rigida zapupe*. The rigid leaves
containing the fibre are about 4 feet long and are harvested biennially
from the fourth to the eighth or tenth year. When a plant has finished
producing it shoots up a tall flower stem, with bulbils or buds on the
end, and then withers.

283 The preparation of stem and leaf fibres is lengthy. First the fleshy
288 tissue encasing the fibre is scraped away, and then the fibre is washed,
hung out to dry, and brushed. It is now ready for grading. Next it is
combed into a continuous sliver of untwisted rope. The final process
is the drawing and twisting of the sliver to a uniform thinness for
spinning into a rope that is particularly resistant to sea-water. The
248 largest plantation is in French Sudan, and stretches for 12 miles
along the bank of the Senegal near Kayes. Other smaller ones are in
Tambacounda and on the Cape Verde peninsula. There is oppor-

SR /98 cont./
645 there was the Grand Farba, a slave of the crown, who performed the functions of head of the army. There was also the Farba Birkeur, or court minister, and a series of dignitaries for various jobs, up to the court jester or Bissète.

S
SR
175
148
The first attempts at French colonization in this part of Senegal date back to 1859, the date of the first military expedition into Sine-Saloum. In 1875, we concluded a treaty of alliance and trade with the king of Saloum, but the provisions were never observed by the native chiefs.

Governor Faidherbe explored the country and carried on reconnaissance as far as Kaolack. Following this demonstration he made a new treaty with the Bour Saloum in 1859. This agreement, like the preceding one, remained a dead letter, and it was necessary to organize an expedition in February 1861. Major Pinet-Laprade was given the command.

The marabout, a warrior of the Toucouleur race, Ma Ba, installed at Nioro-Rip, rose up against our arms.

In 1865 his activities forced us to throw a column into Rip.

Defeated by us, he nevertheless held us in check until 1867, when he was killed in the battle of Somb.

His brother, Mamour Dary, was only able to resist us weakly. Upon his death, Saër Maty resumed hostilities, seizing Kahone, the capital of Saloum.

His power becoming troublesome, an expedition /99/ was deemed necessary. It took place in April 1887, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Coronnat.

Nioro was taken, and on May 14, 1887, a treaty was signed with the chiefs of Saloum, placing Saloum, Niom, and Rip under our protection.

S
[634] An administrator was placed at Foundiougne, and a circle was created.

In 1891, treaties made with the kings of Sine and Saloum secured our authority definitively throughout the country.

The administrative organization was then set up gradually and without difficulties.

/109 cont./

491 line in addition to the normal traffic of pedestrians and vehicles.

653 The colony of Senegal, in concert with the Société Coignet, is currently preparing the agreement, which will be passed immediately and which will require three years for the landing, the embankments of the terrepleins, and the bridge.

The realization of the works and arrangements planned will be an interesting example of close co-operation between the government of the colony, the public works services, the
[441] Kaolack Chambre de Commerce, and private enterprise.

433 To demonstrate the importance of the port of Kaolack, it is sufficient to put some figures before the eyes of the reader. One will get an idea of the growth of the commercial movement that the privileged location of Kaolack on the river enabled one to foresee 15 years ago.

433 In 1905, Kaolack was still a small, insignificant vil-
505 lage. Foundiougne was the great port of the Saloum. But Kaolack was the outlet for an entire hinterland much larger; it was the access route of the products from Baol and Haut-Saloum /Upper Saloum/; finally, it was the natural port for the Sudan. Its approach, 120 kilometers from the ocean and made difficult by the passage of the Sangomar channel and
[502] the sandbanks of the river, has been facilitated by the buoys. Running aground has become much rarer. Piloting, however, is obligatory.

496 Railroads. The railroad from Thiès to Niger, /110/
433 extended by a branch of 22 kilometers, which starts at Guinguinéo and ends at Kaolack, brought out the full importance of the latter point as the lands located near the railroad were improved. This development will take several years. It is steadily and fully progressing today. Like all railroad lines, the artery of the Thiès-Niger breathes life into formerly deserted regions, which are now being populated and opened for colonization.

648 Undoubtedly Kaolack benefited from the non-application
504 of the Franco-British pact of April 8, 1904. As is known,

/110 cont./

648 according to this agreement, Great Britain left to us on the
504 Gambia River, along with the territory of Kantora, the port of
Yarboutenda, which she thought was accessible to ocean-going vessels. If this advantage did not exist, the text added, a port would be selected downstream and ceded to France, along with the lands defined by an arc of one kilometer in radius. Later on, Yarboutenda was discovered to be inaccessible to ocean-going vessels. The French government then had the right to select a port on the Gambia which offered the advantages that the agreement consented to give us. After study, the port of Nianimaro was selected by the Government-general of Dakar. But the negotiations between Paris and London were never concluded.

496 Because of its natural position on a navigable river,
504 Kaolack has remedied a situation which might have been very disadvantageous for our commerce. The rail line was even extended from Kaolack to Lyndiane, over a distance of 12 kilometers, in order to favor a private enterprise established on the river at this place.

Lyndiane is in fact a point on the right bank of the Saloum where vessels can tie up easily. The Etablissements Ch. Peyrissac et Cie., who own this port and have branches in both Senegal and the Sudan, have a real advantage in this privileged situation.

496 We have given some indication above of the development of the railroad: 190 kilometers in Sine-Saloum. The seven stopping stations are: Gossas, Guinguinéo, /111/ Birkelane, Kaffrine, Malem Hodar, Maka-Yop, and Koungheul, all located at the outlet of trade routes carrying groundnuts.

491 Roads. Branching off from this railroad line, as well as
from all the major centers, many highways streak across the
country in every direction. These roads, or rather dirt roads,
[494] are for the most part accessible to automobiles: tourist cars
and transport trucks.

There are more than 3,000 kilometers of dirt roads in the circle, of which 2,000 kilometers are used daily in the dry

/120 cont./

433 Truck gardening. Truck gardens exist in the major
244 centers. This is still, however, a European crop, the native
242 consuming very little of our vegetables.

An experimental garden, or rather a nursery, was set up in Kaolack about 20 years ago. This nursery provided many tree plants for the Europeans and natives (eucalyptus, mimosa, flamboyants, Gambia, mahogany, silk-cotton trees, orange trees, lemon trees, and guava trees).

[648] /121/ European crops. Concessions. No agricultural colonization has been undertaken by Europeans, except at Latmingué.

In 1920, the Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale requested a concession of 200 hectares at Latmingué, 20 kilometers southeast of Kaolack, very near the Saloum, in order to conduct experiments on the mechanical cultivation of groundnuts. Improvements were made for four years. Improved agricultural equipment was used (tractors, gang plows, mechanical seeders, pulverizers, harrow-plows, and pickers). The tests made it possible to get an idea of the advantages of mechanical cultivation of the groundnut. The shortage of manpower, however, was an obstacle to extending the cultivation. The Compagnie Française abandoned this concession, which was recovered and expanded by the Société des Plantations of Latmingué, which now exploits it. The latter cultivates manioc exclusively. It has already cleared 200 hectares and planted 270 hectares in manioc. It is trying to cultivate this plant annually in nine months instead of 18. This development should be watched with interest. The needs of the mother country for manioc are considerable, and Senegal would find there another source of economic prosperity.

233 Animal husbandry. Pasturage is abundant, especially during the rainy season. It is sufficient to raise large herds of cattle, sheep, horses, and donkeys. Epidemics, however, decimate the cattle, which vary between 250,000 and 300,000 heads. During the dry season, the problem of animal fodder is doubled by the difficulty of finding water for the

/122 cont./

317 Current production varies from 20,000 to 30,000 tons, which
433 are consumed in the region and exported to Senegal and the
[651] Sudan. This Société is hampered in its development by the
taxes on salt and by transportation costs which particularly
burden this product.

From time immemorial the natives have been exploiting the salt marshes at Tickat, upstream from Kaolack, and on the arms of the Saloum to the west of Fatick. They produce only what is needed for their consumption. /123/
[651] During the time of the Bours, this exploitation was the occasion
for a fee in kind for the benefit of the sovereign.

433 Native industrie. In addition to the native salt marshes,
258 we might also mention the fish-drying industry. The many
lagoons, marigots, and watercourses of the region contain
an abundance of excellent ocean fish (polynemids, pike,
skate, sole, etc.). The Niominka race, accustomed to fishing, draw a remunerative advantage from it. The drying of
fish is practiced at Fatick, Foundiougne, and in Bas-Saloum.
One can estimate the quantity of dried fish at close to 500
[438] tons per year. The consumption is purely local, and the
markets of the circle and of neighboring circles are the usual
selling places.

433 The only other local industries are those of the potters,
463 basket makers, and weavers. Some native blacksmiths set
up shop in the villages at the time of cultivation; they are,
[326] moreover, of the Ouoloff or Moorish race.

433 European industries. There is only one European in-
258 dustry in the circle. An oil factory for the processing of
groundnuts has been set up at Kaolack by Engineer Gaudart.
● [648] Today this factory belongs to the Société des Huileries et Rizeries
Ouest-Africaines /West African Oil Refinery and Rice Company/. Its equipment is modern. Its production is large; it
[439] sells it in the colony, in France, and in the nearby British
colonies.

/130 cont./

3/12
653 Thus, in the past 15 years, many wells have been dug in Sine-Saloum.

In 1928, 600 reinforced concrete wells and about 400 native wells were counted in the circle. About 10 or 15 wells are completed each year, and as many are mended, repaired, or put in good order. The expenditures are sometimes great, considering that a reinforced concrete well 70 meters deep comes close to 20,000 francs at the present time. There is [463] one or two well-digging experts per canton, who make up their own teams. We thus have there about 30 natives perfectly informed about this work. Sine-Saloum has loaned [648] head well-diggers to the neighboring colonies, especially to Mauritania. The governments there have been very satisfied.

Should the policy of the wells be continued? It /Pl. III appears here/ /131/ has produced results. It has permitted going to what is most pressing. In the villages in the bush, it is the wells that for a long time yet will supply the inhabitant and the herds. In the cities there is the problem of bringing in water. Dakar has been considering this since 1903. Wells have been drilled everywhere in the peninsula of Cape Verde. Potable water has been found in the subsoil, but, until very recently, the quantity was barely sufficient for the needs of the city and the port. Today, the catchment centers at Point B give an abundance of water. It was after the mission of Dr. Moineau that drilling points in the vicinity of large agglomerations, such as Dakar, Thiès, Rufisque, Diourbel, and Kaolack, were proposed by this water-diviner.

For Kaolack, not one attempt has been made by the government of Senegal to verify the hypotheses of Dr. Moineau.

But it has called upon a mining engineer, M. Boyer, to undertake surveys to search it for subterranean waters that could be collected.

This engineer began his investigations at Gossas in Sine-Saloum. They were crowned with success in 1927, with water caught at a depth of 195 meters gushing from the soil; the bringing in of water has begun; the problem appears solved for this trade center.

Lebu
Senegal MS37

/45 cont./ W
a kind of Negro bard or comedian, who do not receive the honors /123
of burial and are therefore deposited in the hollows of certain [766]
trees designated to serve as tombs for them.

May 1822

Meanwhile, M. Roger, the ex-barrister, having become S
governor of our colonies in Africa, sent us the order to go to [648] ●
Sierra Leone to get a library (16) and some cannon belonging to France, which the English had taken away while evacuating our colony.

He advised us on the same occasion, if we happened S
to capture any French ships engaging fraudulently in the slave [439]
trade, to treat them kindly, in order to conform to the paternal instructions of the mother country.

/46/ The metaphor seemed to us rather bold, even for an ex-barrister.

Here I resume the observations that I made during my stay at Cape Verde.

W
The Yoloffe Negroes who people this region are tall /142
and well-proportioned in stature. Their color is darker than
that of all the other Blacks of Africa. They follow the religion W
of Mohammed, but completely distorted by secular idolatrous 771
beliefs.

W
Their marabouts, very influential, sell them very dearly [189]
the grigris or amulets with which they decorate themselves in [793]
order to protect themselves against all evils and all dangers. [751]

Among their religious customs let us note a kind of ban W
which resembles the excommunication of former times. 695

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16. And doubtless also the archives of Senegal. This mission was not crowned with success, "the library having been sent back to Europe" (Herpin, 1913, p. 132).